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Privacy is a concept in disarray.  Nobody can articulate what it means.  
As one commentator has observed, privacy suffers from “an embarrassment 
of meanings.”  Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and 
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lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the importance of “privacy” do not 
fare well when pitted against more concretely stated countervailing inter-
ests. 
In 1960, the famous torts scholar William Prosser attempted to make 
sense of the landscape of privacy law by identifying four different interests.  
But Prosser focused only on tort law, and the law of information privacy is 
significantly more vast and complex, extending to Fourth Amendment law, 
the constitutional right to information privacy, evidentiary privileges, doz-
ens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state statutes.  Moreover, 
Prosser wrote over 40 years ago, and new technologies have given rise to a 
panoply of new privacy harms. 
A new taxonomy to understand privacy violations is thus sorely needed.  
This Article develops a taxonomy to identify privacy problems in a compre-
hensive and concrete manner.  It endeavors to guide the law toward a more 
coherent understanding of privacy and to serve as a framework for the fu-
ture development of the field of privacy law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Jorge Luis Borges’s illuminating parable, Everything and Nothing, a 
gifted playwright creates breathtaking works of literature, populated with an 
unforgettable legion of characters, one after the other imbued with a unique, 
unforgettable personality.1  Despite his spectacular feats of imagination, the 
playwright lives a life of despair.  He can dream up a multitude of charac-
ters—become them, think like them, understand the depths of their souls—
yet he himself has no core, no way to understand himself, no way to define 
who he is.  At the end of the parable, before he dies, the playwright commu-
nicates his despair to God: 
“I who have been so many men in vain want to be one and myself.”  The voice 
of the Lord answered from a whirlwind:  “Neither am I anyone; I have dreamt 
the world as you dreamt your work, my Shakespeare, and among the forms in 
my dream are you, who like myself are many and no one.”2  
Privacy seems to be about everything, and therefore it appears to be 
nothing.  As one commentator observed: 
It is apparent that the word “privacy” has proven to be a powerful rhetorical 
battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts. . . . Like the emotive word “free-
dom,” “privacy” means so many different things to so many different people 
that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have had.3   
Lillian BeVier writes:  “Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denota-
tively to designate a wide range of wildly disparate interests—from confi-
dentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy—and connota-
tively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being asserted 
in its name.”4  Other commentators have lamented that privacy is “vague 
and evanescent,”5 “protean,”6 and suffering from “an embarrassment of 
meanings.”7  “Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy,” 
1 JORGE LUIS BORGES, Everything and Nothing, in LABYRINTHS 248 (Donald A. Yates 
& James E. Irby eds., J.E.I. trans., 1964). 
  2 Id. at 249. 
3 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.59 (2d ed. 
2005). 
4 Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:  Some 
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 458 
(1995) (footnote omitted). 
5 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:  COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND 
DOSSIERS 25 (1971) (citation omitted). 
6 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977). 
7 KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 184-85 (1988). 
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philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson has observed, “is that nobody seems to 
have any very clear idea what it is.”8 
Often, privacy problems are merely stated in knee-jerk form: “That vio-
lates my privacy!”  When we contemplate an invasion of privacy–-such as 
having our personal information gathered by companies in databases–-we 
instinctively recoil.  Many discussions of privacy appeal to people’s fears 
and anxieties.9  What commentators often fail to do, however, is translate 
those instincts into a reasoned, well-articulated account of why privacy 
problems are harmful.  When people claim that privacy should be protected, 
it is unclear precisely what they mean.  This lack of clarity creates a diffi-
culty when making policy or resolving a case because lawmakers and 
judges cannot easily articulate the privacy harm.  The interests on the other 
side-–free speech, efficient consumer transactions, and security-–are often 
much more readily articulated.  Courts and policymakers frequently struggle 
in recognizing privacy interests, and when this occurs, cases are dismissed 
or laws are not passed.  The result is that privacy is not balanced against 
countervailing interests. 
Abstract incantations of “privacy” are not nuanced enough to capture 
the problems involved.  The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, recom-
mends that, as government agencies engage in greater information sharing 
with each other and with businesses, they should “safeguard the privacy of 
individuals about whom information is shared.”10  But what does safeguard-
ing “privacy” mean?  Without an understanding of what the privacy prob-
lems are, how can privacy be addressed in a meaningful way? 
Many commentators have spoken of privacy as a unitary concept with a 
uniform value, which is unvarying across different situations.  In contrast, I 
have argued that privacy violations involve a variety of types of harmful or 
problematic activities.11  Consider the following examples of activities typi-
cally referred to as privacy violations: 
 
8 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRI-
VACY:  AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
9 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1154 (2004) (“[T]he typical privacy article rests its case precisely on an 
appeal to its reader’s intuitions and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations.”). 
10 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT 394 (2004). 
11 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (2002) [here-
inafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy].  In contrast to attempts to conceptualize privacy by 
isolating one or more common “essential” or “core” characteristics, I concluded that there is 
no singular essence found in all “privacy” violations.  See id. at 1095-99 (concluding that “the 
quest for a common denominator or essence . . . can sometimes lead to confusion”). 
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• A newspaper reports the name of a rape victim.12 
• Reporters deceitfully gain entry to a person’s home and secretly pho-
tograph and record the person.13 
• New X-ray devices can see through people’s clothing, amounting to 
what some call a “virtual strip-search.”14 
• The government uses a thermal sensor device to detect heat patterns in 
a person’s home.15 
• A company markets a list of five million elderly incontinent women.16 
• Despite promising not to sell its members’ personal information to 
others, a company does so anyway.17 
 
These violations are clearly not the same.  Despite the wide-ranging 
body of law addressing privacy issues today, commentators often lament the 
law’s inability to adequately protect privacy.18  Courts and policymakers fre-
quently have a singular view of privacy in mind when they assess whether 
or not an activity violates privacy.  As a result, they either conflate distinct 
privacy problems despite significant differences or fail to recognize a prob-
lem entirely.  Privacy problems are frequently misconstrued or inconsis-
tently recognized in the law.  The concept of “privacy” is far too vague to 
guide adjudication and lawmaking.  How can privacy be addressed in a 
manner that is non-reductive and contextual, yet simultaneously useful in 
deciding cases and making sense of the multitude of privacy problems we 
face?    
In this Article, I provide a framework for how the legal system can 
come to a better understanding of privacy.  I aim to develop a taxonomy that 
focuses more specifically on the different kinds of activities that impinge 
upon privacy.  I endeavor to shift focus away from the vague term “privacy” 
12 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989). 
13 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971). 
14 See Beyond X-ray Vision:  Can Big Brother See Right Through Your Clothes?, DIS-
COVER, July 2002, at 24; Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See Market for Detection:  Security 
Techniques Offer New Precision, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2001, at A8. 
15 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
16 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,461, 82,467 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
17 See In re GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 97-98 (1999). 
18 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy:  A Fortress or 
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208 (1992) (“The American legal 
system does not contain a comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively 
address the acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal information 
within the business community.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however, no successful standards, legal or 
otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data in cyberspace.”). 
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and toward the specific activities that pose privacy problems.  Although 
various attempts at explicating the meaning of “privacy” have been made, 
few have attempted to identify privacy problems in a comprehensive and 
concrete manner.19  The most famous attempt was undertaken in 1960 by 
the legendary torts scholar William Prosser.  He discerned four types of 
harmful activities redressed under the rubric of privacy: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or like-
ness.20  
Prosser’s great contribution was to synthesize the cases that emerged from 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous law review article, The Right 
to Privacy.21 
However, Prosser focused only on tort law.  American privacy law is 
significantly more vast and complex, extending beyond torts to the constitu-
tional “right to privacy,” Fourth Amendment law, evidentiary privileges, 
dozens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes.22  
19 In 1967, Alan Westin identified four “basic states of individual privacy”: (1) solitude; 
(2) intimacy; (3) anonymity; and (4) reserve (“the creation of a psychological barrier against 
unwanted intrusion”).  ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (1967).  These cate-
gories focus mostly on spatial distance and separateness; they fail to capture the many differ-
ent dimensions of informational privacy.  In 1992, Ken Gormley surveyed the law of privacy.  
See generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335.  His 
categories-–tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy, fundamental-
decision privacy, and state constitutional privacy-–are based on different areas of law rather 
than on a more systemic conceptual account of privacy.  Id. at 1340.  In 1998, Jerry Kang de-
fined privacy as a union of three overlapping clusters of ideas:  (1) physical space (“the extent 
to which an individual’s territorial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted objects or 
signals”); (2) choice (“an individual’s ability to make certain significant decisions without 
interference”); and (3) flow of personal information (“an individual’s control over the process-
ing—i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use—of personal information”).  Jerry Kang, Infor-
mation Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998).  Kang’s 
understanding of privacy is quite rich, but the breadth of the categories limits their usefulness 
in law.  The same is true of the three categories identified by philosopher Judith DeCew: (1) 
“informational privacy”; (2) “accessibility privacy”; and (3) “expressive privacy.”  JUDITH W. 
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY:  LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75-77 
(1997). 
20 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
21 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195-96 (1890). 
22 See Anita L. Allen, Privacy in American Law, in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL 
EVALUATIONS 19, 26 (Beate Rössler ed., 2004) (“American privacy law is impressive in its 
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The Freedom of Information Act contains two exemptions to protect against 
an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”23  Numerous state public re-
cords laws also contain privacy exemptions.24  Many state constitutions con-
tain provisions explicitly providing for a right to privacy.25 
Moreover, Prosser wrote over forty years ago, before the breathtaking rise 
of the Information Age.  New technologies have given rise to a panoply of 
different privacy problems, and many of them do not readily fit into 
Prosser’s four categories.  Therefore, a new taxonomy to address privacy 
violations for contemporary times is sorely needed. 
The taxonomy I develop is an attempt to identify and understand the 
different kinds of socially recognized privacy violations, one that hopefully 
will enable courts and policymakers to better balance privacy against coun-
tervailing interests.  The purpose of this taxonomy is to aid in the develop-
ment of the law that addresses privacy.  Although the primary focus will be 
on the law, this taxonomy is not simply an attempt to catalog existing laws, 
as was Prosser’s purpose.  Rather, it is an attempt to understand various pri-
vacy harms and problems that have achieved a significant degree of social 
recognition.  I will frequently use the law as a source for determining what 
privacy violations society recognizes.  However, my aim is not simply to 
take stock of where the law currently stands today, but to provide a useful 
framework for its future development. 
THE TAXONOMY 
Privacy cannot be understood independently from society.  As sociolo-
gist Barrington Moore aptly observes, “the need for privacy is a socially 
quantity and scope.”).  For a survey of the vast scope of the law of information privacy, see 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2003). 
23 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000) (exempting “personnel and medical files and similar files 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); 
id. § 552b(c)(7) (exempting disclosure of “investigatory records compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes that “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” at open meet-
ings). 
24 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:  Public Records, Privacy and the Con-
stitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1160-64 (2002) (examining federal and state freedom of 
information acts and their exemptions). 
25 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recog-
nized and shall not be infringed.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be 
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as other-
wise provided herein.”). 
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created need.  Without society there would be no need for privacy.”26  Soci-
ety is fraught with conflict and friction.  Individuals, institutions, and gov-
ernments can all engage in activities that have problematic effects on the 
lives of others. 
Privacy is the relief from a range of kinds of social friction.  It enables 
people to engage in worthwhile activities in ways that they would otherwise 
find difficult or impossible.  Of course, privacy is not freedom from all 
forms of social friction; rather, it is protection from a cluster of related ac-
tivities that impinge upon people in related ways.  This taxonomy attempts 
to identify and organize these problematic activities.27  These activities of-
ten are not inherently problematic or harmful.  If a person consents to most 
of these activities, there is no privacy violation.28  Thus, if a couple invites 
another to watch them have sex, this observation would not constitute a pri-
vacy violation.  Without consent, however, it most often would. 
Of course, declaring that an activity is harmful or problematic does not 
automatically imply that there should be legal redress, since there may be 
valid reasons why the law should not get involved or why countervailing 
interests should prevail.  As Anita Allen argues, there are certainly times 
when people should be held accountable for their private activities.29  The 
26 BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY:  STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 
73 (1984). 
27 This taxonomy focuses on activities of others that can and do create privacy harms or 
problems.  The full equation for a privacy violation or problem is the existence of a certain 
activity that causes harms or problems affecting a private matter or activity.  This taxonomy 
focuses on the first part of the equation (harmful or problematic activities) rather than on what 
constitutes a private matter or activity.  Since the question of which matters and activities are 
private is too culturally variable and contextual, this taxonomy focuses on potentially harmful 
or problematic activities, about which I believe meaningful generalizations can be made.  De-
spite the fact that the taxonomy limits its focus to the activities that harm or cause problems 
for private matters or activities, I believe that the taxonomy serves as a useful way for the law 
to approach and comprehend privacy problems.  While the entire “privacy equation” must be 
worked out in each particular case, the taxonomy aims to carve up the landscape in a way that 
the law can begin to comprehend and engage.  All taxonomies are generalizations based upon 
a particular focus, and they are valuable only insofar as they are useful.  It is my hope that this 
taxonomy succeeds by this metric. 
28 Of course, there remains the issue of what constitutes valid consent, as there are many 
occasions in which people affirmatively give out information that should not be assumed to be 
consensual.  See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:  Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1397-98 (2000) (arguing that “people are demonstrably bad 
at” assessing the risk of future harms that may flow from the piecemeal, otherwise consensual 
collection of their private data); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1661-64 (1999) (discussing the 
legal fiction of consent in the context of the Internet, specifically the use of boilerplate consent 
forms that do not require user agreement before taking effect). 
29 See ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING 2, 146 (2003) (discussing 
tort theories available as recourse for the invasion of privacy in the context of sexual harass-
ment claims). 
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purpose of this taxonomy is not to argue that the law should or should not 
protect against certain activities that affect privacy.  Rather, the goal is sim-
ply to define the activities and explain why and how they can cause trouble.  
The question of when and how the law should regulate can only be an-
swered in each specific context in which the question arises.  But attempts 
to answer this question are increasingly suffering because of confusion 
about defining the troublesome activities that fall under the rubric of pri-
vacy.  This taxonomy will aid us in analyzing various privacy problems so 
the law can better address them and balance them with opposing interests. 
In devising a taxonomy, there are many different ways to go about carv-
ing up the landscape.  I focus on the activities that invade privacy.  The pur-
pose of the taxonomy is to assist the legal system in grappling with the con-
cept of privacy.  Since the goal of the law is to have privacy protections that 
best prevent and redress particular problems, we need to first understand the 
problems in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the protections. 
Therefore, my focus is on activities that create problems.  I aim to show 
that these activities differ significantly yet share many commonalities.  Pri-
vacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single essence.  
Attempts to find such an essence often end up being too broad and vague, 
with little usefulness in addressing concrete issues.  Elsewhere, I have ar-
gued that privacy is best understood as a family resemblance concept.30  As 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein explained, certain things may not share 
one common characteristic, but they nevertheless are “related to one an-
other in many different ways.”31  Wittgenstein analogized to members of a 
family, who generally share some traits with each other (eye color, height, 
facial structure, hair color, etc.), although they may not have one common 
trait.32  There is, however, “a complicated network of similarities overlap-
ping and criss-crossing.”33 
The term “privacy” is an umbrella term, referring to a wide and dispa-
rate group of related things.  The use of such a broad term is helpful in some 
contexts yet quite unhelpful in others.  Consider, for example, the term 
“animal.”  “Animal” refers to a large group of organisms—there are mam-
mals, birds, reptiles, fish, and so on.  Within each of these groups are sub-
groups.  For some purposes, using the term “animal” will suffice.  Suppose 
Sue asks Bob, “How many animals are in the zoo?”  Bob does not need to 
know anything more specific in order to answer this question.  The use of 
30 Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1096-99. 
31 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 65 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1968) (1958). 
32 Id. § 67. 
33 Id. § 66. 
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the term “animal” in this sentence will be perfectly clear in most contexts.  
Now suppose Sue wants Bob to bring her a dog.  She will not get very far 
by saying, “Bring me an animal.”  Rather, she will specify the kind of ani-
mal she wants.  Even saying “dog” probably will not be adequate, since Sue 
probably wants a specific kind of dog.  As with the term “animal,” there are 
many times when using the general term “privacy” will work well.  But 
there are times where more specificity is required.  Using the general term 
“privacy” can result in the conflation of different kinds of problems and can 
lead to understandings of the meaning of “privacy” that distract courts and 
policymakers from addressing the issues before them. 
The taxonomy demonstrates that there are connections between differ-
ent harms and problems.  It is no accident that various problems are referred 
to as privacy violations; they bear substantial similarities to each other.  But 
we also must recognize where they diverge.  The goal is to define more pre-
cisely what the problem is in each context—how it is unique, how it differs 
from other problems, and how it is related to other types of privacy prob-
lems. 
Often these problems involve harms to individuals.  Certain kinds of 
harm, such as physical injuries, are very easy to articulate and understand.  
A privacy violation presents a more difficult case.  Warren and Brandeis 
spoke of privacy as an incorporeal rather than a physical injury.  They noted 
that the law was beginning to recognize nonphysical harms and that “mod-
ern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon [a person’s] pri-
vacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be 
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”34  Privacy, contended the authors, involves 
“injury to the feelings.”35 
The harms Warren and Brandeis spoke of are dignitary harms.  The 
classic example of such a harm is reputational injury.  As Warren and 
Brandeis noted, defamation law has long recognized and redressed this kind 
of injury that lowered people in the esteem of others.36  But as Warren and 
Brandeis understood, and as this taxonomy will demonstrate, there are other 
kinds of dignitary harm beyond reputational injury.  These are the harms of 
incivility, lack of respect, or causing emotional angst.  At the time Warren 
and Brandeis wrote, they were concerned that such dignitary harms might 
strike some as too ethereal to be legally cognizable.37  Their project aimed 
to demonstrate that these were genuine harms that were legally cogniza-
34 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 196. 
35 Id. at 197. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 198 (noting that traditionally, “our system . . . does not afford a remedy even 
for mental suffering which results from mere contumely and insult”). 
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ble.38  And they succeeded, as Prosser emphatically demonstrated in 1960 
by collecting hundreds of cases.39 
There is another, more modern kind of privacy problem that does not 
readily fit with this dignitary understanding of harm.  These problems are 
more structural in nature.  I refer to them as “architectural” problems.40  
They involve less the overt insult or reputational harm to a person and more 
the creation of the risk that a person might be harmed in the future.  They 
are akin, in many ways, to environmental harms or pollution.  In the taxon-
omy, two kinds of architectural issues emerge most often.  First is the en-
hancement of the risk that a harm will occur.  Activities involving a per-
son’s information, for example, might create a greater risk of that person 
being victimized by identity theft or fraud.  Such risk-enhancing activities 
increase the chances of the individual suffering dignitary harms as well as 
monetary or physical harms.  Second, a particular activity can upset the bal-
ance of social or institutional power in undesirable ways.  A particular indi-
vidual may not be harmed directly, but this balance of power can affect that 
person’s life.  The classic example is law enforcement officials having too 
much power, which can alter the way people engage in their activities.  
People’s behavior might be chilled, making them less likely to attend politi-
cal rallies or criticize popular views.  Surveillance can also have these ef-
fects.  This kind of harm is often referred to as a “chilling effect.”41  Imbal-
ances in power can also be risk enhancing, in that they increase the risk of 
abuses of power. 
When we speak of these activities, we often focus on how they affect an 
individual’s life.  This does not mean that privacy is an individualistic right.  
Philosopher John Dewey astutely argued that individual rights need not be 
justified as the immutable possessions of individuals; instead, they are in-
strumental in light of “the contribution they make to the welfare of the 
community.”42  Employing a similar insight, several scholars contend that 
privacy is “constitutive” of society.  Constitutive privacy understands pri-
38 See id. at 197 (positing that a “legal remedy for [a privacy] injury” would treat the 
“wound[ing of] feelings[] as a substantive cause of action”). 
39 See Prosser, supra note 20, at 389 (examining over three hundred cases to find legal 
recognition of “four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff”). 
40 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 97-101 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON] (identifying 
the influence of “an architecture that structures power, a regulatory framework that governs 
how information is disseminated, collected and networked” on protecting privacy). 
41 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 1, 13 (1972) (confronting the alleged “chilling 
effect” that Army surveillance had on “lawful and peaceful civilian political activity”). 
42 JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, in 11 LATER WORKS 372, 373 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1987) (1936). 
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vacy harms as extending beyond the “mental pain and distress” caused to 
particular individuals; privacy harms affect the nature of society and impede 
individual activities that contribute to the greater social good.  Spiros 
Simitis recognizes that “privacy considerations no longer arise out of par-
ticular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting every-
one.”43  Robert Post contends that the tort of invasion of privacy “safe-
guards rules of civility that in some significant measure constitute both 
individuals and community.”44  The theory of constitutive privacy has been 
further developed by Julie Cohen and Paul Schwartz, who both argue that 
privacy is a constitutive element of a civil society.45 
In the taxonomy that follows, there are four basic groups of harmful ac-
tivities:  (1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) informa-
tion dissemination, and (4) invasion.  Each of these groups consists of dif-
ferent related subgroups of harmful activities. 
I have arranged these groups around a model that begins with the data 
subject–-the individual whose life is most directly affected by the activities 
classified in the taxonomy.  From that individual, various entities (other 
people, businesses, and the government) collect information.  The collection 
of this information itself can constitute a harmful activity.  Not all informa-
tion collection is harmful, but certain kinds of collection can be.  Those that 
collect the data (the “data holders”) then process it-–they store it, combine 
it, manipulate it, search it, and use it.  I label these activities as “information 
processing.”46  The next step is “information dissemination,” in which the 
data holders transfer the information to others or release the information.  
The general progression from information collection to processing to dis-
semination is the data moving further away from the control of the individ-
ual.  The last grouping of activities is “invasions,” which involve impinge-
43 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 
709 (1987).  In analyzing the problems of federal legislative policymaking on privacy, 
Priscilla Regan demonstrates the need for understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits.  
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, xiv (1995) (“[A]nalysis of congressional 
policy making reveals that little attention was given to the possibility of a broader social im-
portance of privacy.”). 
44 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:  Community and Self in the Com-
mon Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989). 
45 See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1427-28 (“Informational privacy, in short, is a constitu-
tive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of the term.”); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 
1613 (“[I]nformation privacy is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil society.”); 
see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980) (“Pri-
vacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and encourages the moral 
autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”). 
46 I borrow the term “processing” from the European Union Data Protection Directive.  
See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
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ments directly on the individual.  Instead of the progression away from the 
individual, invasions progress toward the individual and do not necessarily 
involve information.  The relationship between these different groupings is 
depicted in Figure 1 below.47 
 
47 I thank Peter Swire for suggesting and helping to develop this diagram. 
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The first group of activities that affect privacy involves information col-
lection.  Surveillance is the watching, listening to, or recording of an indi-
vidual’s activities.  Interrogation consists of various forms of questioning or 
probing for information. 
A second group of activities involves the way information is stored, 
manipulated, and used–-what I refer to collectively as “information process-
ing.”  Aggregation involves the combination of various pieces of data about 
a person.  Identification is linking information to particular individuals.  In-
security involves carelessness in protecting stored information from leaks 
and improper access.  Secondary use is the use of information collected for 
one purpose for a different purpose without the data subject’s consent.  Ex-
clusion concerns the failure to allow the data subject to know about the data 
that others have about her and participate in its handling and use.  These ac-
tivities do not involve the gathering of data, since it has already been col-
lected.  Instead, these activities involve the way data is maintained and used. 
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The third group of activities involves the dissemination of information.  
Breach of confidentiality is breaking a promise to keep a person’s informa-
tion confidential.  Disclosure involves the revelation of truthful information 
about a person that impacts the way others judge her character.  Exposure 
involves revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions.  Increased 
accessibility is amplifying the accessibility of information.  Blackmail is the 
threat to disclose personal information.  Appropriation involves the use of 
the data subject’s identity to serve the aims and interests of another.  Distor-
tion consists of the dissemination of false or misleading information about 
individuals.  Information dissemination activities all involve the spreading 
or transfer of personal data or the threat to do so. 
The fourth and final group of activities involves invasions into people’s 
private affairs.  Invasion, unlike the other groupings, need not involve per-
sonal information (although in numerous instances, it does).  Intrusion con-
cerns invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquility or solitude.  Decisional in-
terference involves the government’s incursion into the data subject’s 
decisions regarding her private affairs. 
A.  Information Collection 
Information collection creates disruption based on the process of data 
gathering.  Even if no information is revealed publicly, information collec-
tion can create harm.  I will identify two forms of information collection:  
(1) surveillance and (2) interrogation. 
1.  Surveillance 
For a long time, surveillance has been viewed as problematic.  The term 
“Peeping Tom” originates from a legend dating back to 1050.  When Lady 
Godiva rode naked on a horse in the city of Coventry to protest taxes, a 
young man named Tom gawked at her, and he was punished by being 
blinded.48  Today, many states have Peeping Tom laws.  South Carolina, for 
example, criminalizes “peep[ing] through windows, doors, or other like 
places, on or about the premises of another, for the purpose of spying upon 
or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and any other conduct of a 
48 CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION 36-38 (2000); Avishai Margalit, Privacy in the 
Decent Society, 68 SOC. RES. 255, 259 (2001).  In another version of the story, Tom is not 
blinded by others, but inexplicably struck blind upon looking at her after Lady Godiva asked 
the townspeople not to look.  BBC, Beyond the Broadcast, Making History:  Lady Godiva of 
Coventry, http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/beyond/factsheets/makhist/ 
makhist6_prog9d.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
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similar nature, that tends to invade the privacy of others.”49  Some states 
prohibit two-way mirrors in certain areas.50 
As with visual surveillance, audio surveillance has long been viewed as 
troubling.  William Blackstone noted that eavesdropping was a common law 
crime, and defined it as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves of 
a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and 
mischievous tales.”51  These attitudes persisted after the emergence of elec-
tronic eavesdropping.  As early as 1862, California prohibited the intercep-
tion of telegraph communications.52  Soon after telephone wiretapping be-
gan in the 1890s, several states prohibited it, such as California in 1905.53  
By 1928, over half the states had made wiretapping a crime.54  Justice 
Holmes referred to wiretapping as a “dirty business,”55 and Justice Frank-
furter called it “odious.”56  When the Supreme Court held in the 1928 case 
Olmstead v. United States that the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
against wiretapping,57 Congress responded six years later by making wire-
tapping a federal crime.58  In 1967, the Supreme Court changed its position 
on wiretapping, overruling Olmstead in Katz v. United States.59  One year 
later, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, Title III of which provided comprehensive protection against wiretap-
ping.60  Title III required law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before 
49 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(A) (2003); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (2003) 
(criminalizing being a “peeping Tom” when “on or about the premises of another”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (2004) (defining “Peeping Tom” and setting forth the penalty); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (Supp. 2004) (criminalizing peeping as a Class 1 misdemeanor); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-130 (2004) (criminalizing peeping or spying into a “dwelling or enclo-
sure”). 
50 For example, in California, “[a]ny person who installs or who maintains . . . any two-
way mirror permitting observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower, 
locker room, fitting room, motel room, or hotel room is guilty of a misdemeanor.”  CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 653n (West 1988). 
51 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169. 
52 SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25-26 (1959). 
53 Id. at 8, 25. 
54 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 841 (2004) (citing Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967)). 
55 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
56 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
57 277 U.S. at 466. 
58 See Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2520, 48 Stat. 1103 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)). 
59 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
60 Pub. L. No. 90-351, ch. 119, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (2000)). 
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wiretapping and criminalized wiretaps by private parties.61  Congress 
amended Title III in 1986 with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), expanding Title III’s protections from wiretapping to additional 
forms of electronic surveillance.62 
What is the harm if people or the government watch or listen to us?  
Certainly, we all watch or listen, even when others may not want us to, and 
we often do not view this as problematic.  However, when done in a certain 
manner—such as continuous monitoring—surveillance has problematic ef-
fects.  For example, people expect to be looked at when they ride the bus or 
subway, but persistent gawking can create feelings of anxiety and discom-
fort. 
Not only can direct awareness of surveillance make a person feel ex-
tremely uncomfortable, but it can also cause that person to alter her behav-
ior.  Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and inhibition.63  Because of its 
inhibitory effects, surveillance is a tool of social control, enhancing the 
power of social norms, which work more effectively when people are being 
observed by others in the community.64  John Gilliom observes:  “Surveil-
lance of human behavior is in place to control human behavior, whether by 
limiting access to programs or institutions, monitoring and affecting behav-
ior within those arenas, or otherwise enforcing rules and norms by observ-
ing and recording acts of compliance and deviance.”65  This aspect of sur-
veillance does not automatically make it harmful, though, since social 
control can be beneficial and every society must exercise a sizeable degree 
of social control.  For example, surveillance can serve as a deterrent to 
crime.  Many people desire the discipline and control surveillance can bring.  
Jeff Rosen observes that Britain’s closed circuit television (CCTV)—a net-
61 82 Stat. 213-14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000)). 
62 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 (2000)) (ex-
panding Titles I-III to protect “wire, oral, or electronic communications”). 
63 See Kang, supra note 19, at 1193, 1260 (“Simply put, surveillance leads to self-
censorship.”); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government 
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 473 (1999) (“If I know I am under surveillance, I 
might . . . restrict my activities, so that nothing embarrassing or otherwise harmful could be 
detected.”). 
64 As Judge Posner notes, “norms are more effective when people are under the observa-
tion of their peers.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THE-
ORY 75 (1999); see also JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 28 
(1974) (finding both large-scale and less formal surveillance to be helpful to a government “or 
any other agency seeking to obtain compliance from a mass clientele in a large-scale social 
setting”). 
65 JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR:  SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 3 (2001). 
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work of over four million public surveillance cameras—is widely perceived 
as “a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful uncle 
or aunt.”66 
Too much social control, however, can adversely impact freedom, crea-
tivity, and self-development.  According to Julie Cohen, “pervasive moni-
toring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices 
toward the bland and the mainstream.”67  Monitoring constrains the “ac-
ceptable spectrum of belief and behavior,” and it results in “a subtle yet 
fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of 
rough edges and sharp lines.”68  Surveillance thus “threatens not only to 
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to 
dampen the force of our aspirations to it.”69  Similarly, Paul Schwartz ar-
gues that surveillance inhibits freedom of choice, impinging upon self-
determination.70 
In many instances, people are not directly aware that they are being ob-
served.  Does covert surveillance cause a problem?  Under one view, sur-
veillance is a prima facie wrong, whether overt or covert, for it demonstrates 
a lack of respect for its subject as an autonomous person.  Philosopher 
Stanley Benn explains that overt surveillance does so by threatening its tar-
get’s “consciousness of pure freedom as subject, as originator and 
chooser.”71  As Benn contends, “[f]inding oneself an object of scrutiny, as 
the focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of one-
self, as something seen through another’s eyes.”72  Turning to covert obser-
vation, Benn explains that it “is objectionable because it deliberately de-
ceives a person about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his 
reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice.”73 
Although concealed spying is certainly deceptive, Benn’s argument is 
unconvincing.  It is the awareness that one is being watched that affects 
one’s freedom, and Benn fails to explain why covert surveillance has any 
palpable effect on a person’s welfare or activities.  A more compelling rea-
son why covert surveillance is problematic is that it can have a chilling ef-
66 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD:  RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN 
ANXIOUS AGE 36 (2004). 
67 Cohen, supra note 28, at 1426. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1656 (“[P]erfected surveillance of naked thought’s 
digital expression short-circuits the individual’s own process of decisionmaking.”). 
71 Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII:  PRI-
VACY 1, 7 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 10. 
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fect on behavior.  In fact, there can be an even greater chilling effect when 
people are generally aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never 
sure if they are being watched at any particular moment.  This phenomenon 
is known as the Panoptic effect, based on Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 architec-
tural design for a prison called the Panopticon.74  The prison was set up with 
the inmates’ cells arrayed around a central observation tower.  Most impor-
tantly, the guards could see each prisoner from the tower, but the prisoners 
could not see the guards from their cells.75  In Michel Foucault’s words, the 
cells were akin to “small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly in-
dividualized and constantly visible.”76  The prisoner’s “only rational option” 
was to conform with the prison’s rules because, at any moment, it was pos-
sible that they were being watched.77  Thus, awareness of the possibility of 
surveillance can be just as inhibitory as actual surveillance. 
One might attempt to imagine surveillance so covert that its subjects are 
completely unaware of even the possibility of being observed.  While such 
well-concealed surveillance might eliminate the potential for any discomfort 
or chilling effect, it would still enable the watchers to gather a substantial 
degree of information about people, creating an architectural problem.78  
Surveillance is a sweeping form of investigatory power.  It extends beyond a 
search, for it records behavior, social interaction, and potentially everything 
that a person says and does.  Rather than targeting specific information, sur-
veillance can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond any originally 
sought.  If watched long enough, a person might be caught in some form of 
illegal or immoral activity, and this information could then be used to dis-
credit or blackmail her.  A prime example is the FBI’s extensive wiretapping 
of Martin Luther King, Jr., widely believed to have been initiated in order to 
expose King’s alleged communist ties.  Though the surveillance failed to turn 
up any evidence of such ties, it did reveal King’s extramarital affairs.  The 
FBI then attempted to blackmail King with the information, and FBI officials 
leaked it in order to discredit King.79 
The law addresses surveillance, but does so by focusing on where sur-
veillance takes place rather than on its problematic effects.  The law often 
74 DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE:  THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62-67 
(1994). 
75 Id. at 62-63. 
76 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books, 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
77 LYON, supra note 74, at 63. 
 78 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
79 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 185.  For a more extensive account 
of King’s experience with the FBI, see DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. (1981). 
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recognizes surveillance as a harm in private places but rarely in public 
places.  In Fourth Amendment law, courts frequently conclude that surveil-
lance in private places implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy 
whereas surveillance in public places does not.  In Kyllo v. United States, 
the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant in order 
to use a thermal-imaging device to detect heat patterns emanating from a 
person’s home.80  The Court’s holding relied heavily on the fact that, though 
conducted outside the petitioner’s home, the surveillance was capturing in-
formation about activities within it:  “We have said that the Fourth Amend-
ment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.”81 
When surveillance occurs in a public place, however, the Court has re-
fused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In Florida v. Riley, 
the police flew over the defendant’s greenhouse in a helicopter at four hun-
dred feet and peered down through a few missing roof panels to observe that 
he was growing marijuana.82  The Court concluded that the defendant 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy:  “As a general proposition, the 
police may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where [they 
have] a right to be.”83  In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court held 
that the government could not only fly over the petitioner’s property and ob-
serve it with the naked eye, but could also use a powerful aerial mapping 
camera that enabled the identification of objects as small as one-half inch in 
diameter.84 
The contrast between the law’s approach to surveillance in private and 
in public is most evident in a pair of Supreme Court cases involving loca-
tion-tracking devices.  In United States v. Karo, the Court concluded that a 
tracking device that monitored a person’s movements within his home im-
plicated that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.85  In contrast, in 
United States v. Knotts, the police placed a tracking device in a can of chlo-
roform, which the defendant then purchased and placed in his car.86  Using 
the device, the police tracked the location of the defendant’s vehicle.87  Ac-
cording to the Court, the surveillance “amounted principally to the follow-
80 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
81 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth 
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:  Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 144 (2002) (“Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the 
thermal imager revealed information concerning activities inside the home.”). 
82 488 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1989). 
83 Id. at 449 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986). 
85 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
86 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
87 Id. 
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ing of an automobile on public streets and highways.”88  The Court con-
cluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[a] person travel-
ing in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”89  Therefore, the 
Court has concluded that while the Fourth Amendment protects against sur-
veillance in private places such as one’s home, the Amendment has little 
applicability to surveillance in public places.90  This understanding of pri-
vacy stems from what I call the “secrecy paradigm.”91  Under the secrecy 
paradigm, privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy viola-
tion occurs when concealed data is revealed to others.  If the information is 
not previously hidden, then no privacy interest is implicated by the collec-
tion or dissemination of the information.  In many areas of law, this narrow 
view of privacy has limited the recognition of privacy violations. 
Tort law is generally consistent with this approach.  Courts have applied 
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which protects against intrusion “upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,”92 to 
surveillance of private places.  In Hamberger v. Eastman, for example, the 
court concluded that a couple had a valid intrusion claim against their land-
lord for his installation of a hidden recording device in their bedroom.93  In 
contrast, plaintiffs bringing claims involving surveillance in public have 
generally not been successful.94   
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 281. 
90 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public 
Space:  Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1349, 1357 (2004) (“[C]ontemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence differentiates 
pervasive video surveillance from more familiar mass suspicionless searches in one crucial 
respect:  by holding that it is not a ‘search’ at all.”); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:  
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 233 
(2002) (“Meaningful legal strictures on government use of public surveillance cameras in 
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are non-existent.”). 
91 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 42-44. 
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
93 206 A.2d 239, 241-42 (N.H. 1964); see also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 
1431 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding media surveillance of a couple’s activities in their home to be 
actionable under intrusion tort); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931) (holding 
that wiretapping a person’s phone gives rise to a tort action because it violates his right “to the 
privacy of his home as against the unwarranted invasion of others”). 
94 See, e.g., Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding 
that the defendant was not liable under intrusion tort for trespassing into a private club to en-
gage in video surveillance of the plaintiff because the club was not a secluded place); Forster 
v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 149-50 (Pa. 1963) (finding no intrusion liability when a private 
investigator followed and filmed the plaintiff because the surveillance was conducted in pub-
lic). 
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In some cases, however, courts have recognized a harm in public sur-
veillance.  For example, in Nader v. General Motors Corp., Ralph Nader 
charged that General Motors’s automobiles were unsafe.95  General Motors 
undertook a massive investigation seeking information discrediting Nader.  
Among other things, General Motors wiretapped his telephone and placed 
him under extensive surveillance while in public.96  The court recognized 
that certain kinds of public surveillance might amount to an invasion of pri-
vacy; although observation “in a public place does not amount to an inva-
sion of . . . privacy,” in certain instances, “surveillance may be so ‘overzeal-
ous’ as to render it actionable.”97  The court noted:  “A person does not 
automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public 
place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the 
right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing.”98  The 
majority reasoned that extensive public surveillance can reveal hidden de-
tails that would not ordinarily be observed by others.99  The court’s analysis, 
however, focused more on the harm of disclosure than on that of surveil-
lance; pervasive surveillance could reveal details people ordinarily conceal, 
and thus result in the discovery of secrets.100  The court did not recognize 
the surveillance as a harm itself—only surveillance that destroyed secrecy 
represented an actionable harm.101 
Therefore, although the law often focuses on whether surveillance oc-
curs in a public or private place, surveillance is harmful in all settings, not 
just private ones.102  Surveillance in public can certainly cause uneasiness, 
as illustrated by the example of being stared at continuously in public.  As 
Alan Westin observes:  “Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic ob-
servation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that 
men seek in open spaces and public arenas.”103  Moreover, public surveil-
lance can have chilling effects that make people less likely to associate with 
95 225 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 771. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 769. 
100 Id. at 768-69. 
101 Id. at 771 (“On the other hand, if the plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal that 
fact to any casual observer, then, it may not be said that the appellant intruded into his private 
sphere.”). 
102 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STANDARDS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE RELATING TO TECHNOLOGICALLY-
ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE § 2-6.1(d) to (g) (Draft 3d ed. 1997) (recommending that 
the law begin to address the harms of public surveillance). 
103 WESTIN, supra note 19, at 31. 
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certain groups, attend rallies, or speak at meetings.104  Espousing radical be-
liefs and doing unconventional things takes tremendous courage; the atten-
tive gaze, especially the government’s, can make these acts seem all the 
more daring and their potential risks all the more inhibitory.  Thus, the dig-
nitary harms and architectural problems of surveillance can occur both in 
public and private places.  The law, however, tends to focus more on se-
crecy than on the particular problems and harms caused by surveillance. 
2.  Interrogation 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”105  The Amendment 
creates a “privilege against self-incrimination,” and it prevents the govern-
ment from compelling individuals to testify against themselves.106  The 
privilege has been justified as protecting against “[t]he essential and inher-
ent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt,”107 as “a safeguard 
of conscience and human dignity,”108 and as promoting “respect for per-
sonal integrity.”109 
What is so inhumane about having to answer the government’s ques-
tions about one’s criminal acts?  Why do we want to protect a potentially 
guilty person from having to divulge her criminal activities? 
A different, less coercive form of interrogation occurs when others or 
the government ask questions for purposes other than criminal prosecution.  
In the late nineteenth century, there was a loud public outcry when the U.S. 
census began including more and more questions relating to personal af-
fairs, such as marital status, literacy, property ownership, health, and fi-
nances.110  In the 1870s, an editorial in The New York Times, as well as edi-
torials in other papers, decried the “inquisitorial” nature of the census.111  A 
poem in The New York Sun in 1890 humorously criticized the census: 
104 As Justice Douglas observed in another case:  “Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly 
kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.”  United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
105 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
106 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 92-93 (1979) (emphasis 
omitted). 
107 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting). 
108 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
109 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 488 (1968). 
110 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1401 (2001). 
111 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE:  PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 62 (2000). 
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I am a census inquisitor. 
I travel about from door to door, 
From house to house, from store to store, 
With pencil and paper and power galore. 
I do as I like and ask what I please. 
Down before me you must get on your knees; 
So open your books, hand over your keys, 
And tell me about your chronic disease.112 
Why was there such an outcry?  When asked a probing question that 
people find unwarranted, a frequent response is a snippy reply: “None of 
your business!”  Why do such questions evoke such a response?  Why do 
people take offense even at being asked certain questions—let alone being 
compelled to answer them? 
Understood broadly, these examples all involve a similar practice—
what I call “interrogation.”  Interrogation is the pressuring of individuals to 
divulge information.  Interrogation has many benefits; it is useful for ferret-
ing out information that others want to know. 
However, interrogation can create harm.  Part of this harm arises from 
the degree of coerciveness involved.  The Fifth Amendment privilege pro-
tects against highly coercive interrogation about matters with enormous per-
sonal stakes for the examined subject.113  However, for interrogation gener-
ally, the compulsion need not be direct; nor must it rise to the level of 
outright coercion.  Compulsion can consist of the fear of not getting a job or 
of social opprobrium.  People take offense when others ask an unduly prob-
ing question—even if there is no compulsion to answer.  One explanation 
may be that people still feel some degree of compulsion because not an-
swering might create the impression that they have something to hide.  This 
is why, I believe, there are social norms against asking excessively probing 
or prying questions:  they make the person being questioned feel uncom-
fortable.  Interrogation forces people to be concerned about how they will 
explain themselves or how their refusal to answer will appear to others. 
Interrogation resembles intrusion in its invasiveness, for interrogation is 
a probing, a form of searching.  Like disclosure, interrogation often involves 
the divulging of concealed information; unlike disclosure, interrogation can 
create discomfort even if the information is barely disseminated.  To some 
degree, surveillance resembles interrogation, for both involve the involun-
tary gathering of information.  Interrogation, however, occurs with the con-
scious awareness of the subject; surveillance can be clandestine. 
112 Id. at 63. 
113 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (explaining the Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation). 
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Historically, interrogation has been employed to impinge upon freedom 
of association and belief.  During the McCarthy era in the 1950s, the House 
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) employed interrogation to at-
tack Communists and inhibit their association and expression of political 
beliefs.114  Dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, in which the Court up-
held the Committee’s power to force a witness to answer questions about 
Communist ties,115 Justices Black, Warren and Douglas argued that the in-
terrogation’s harm did not affect the witness alone.116  They spoke of inter-
rogation impeding “the interest of the people as a whole in being able to 
join organizations, advocate causes and make political ‘mistakes’ without 
later being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for 
themselves.”117 
Another aspect of the power of interrogation is its potential for resulting 
in distortion.  The interrogator possesses extraordinary control over what 
information is elicited, how it is interpreted, and the impressions created by 
its revelations.  A skillful interrogator can orchestrate a dialogue that creates 
impressions and inferences that she wants to elicit.  In cross-examination, a 
skilled attorney can carefully manipulate what a witness says and can in-
timidate a witness into coming across less favorably.  Thus, one of the ra-
tionales justifying the privilege against self-incrimination is that it protects 
accuracy.118  Even in the absence of deliberate manipulation, the interroga-
tion process can be distorting.  “The interrogat[ion],” observes Peter 
Brooks, “seeks to pattern the unfolding narrative according to a precon-
ceived story.”119  Interrogation can be distorting because information is elic-
ited by another, often without an interest in learning the whole story.  In 
questionnaires and standardized forms, for example, distortion creeps in be-
cause the questions often do not ask for the entire story or are phrased in 
certain ways that yield deceptive results. 
114 ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:  MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 369-70 
(1998). 
115 360 U.S. 109, 127, 134 (1959). 
116 Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. (emphasis added). 
118 As Wigmore noted:  “The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readi-
ness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture.”  8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251 n.1(c) (John T. McNaughton ed., 4th ed. 1961). 
119 PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS:  SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERA-
TURE 40 (2000).  The interrogation of Dimitri Karamazov in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Broth-
ers Karamazov is an excellent literary example of how interrogation distorts the truth even 
when the interrogators bear no deliberate motivation to distort.  See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, 
THE FAILURE OF THE WORD 55-58 (1984) (commenting on “Dostoevsk[y]’s belief that the 
legal investigator, like the novelist himself, is motivated by an essentially personalized vision 
of reality”). 
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Beyond the Fifth Amendment, there are numerous legal protections 
against interrogation.  The First Amendment prevents government question-
ing about one’s political associations.  In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny and struck down a law requiring public teachers to list 
all organizations to which they belong or contribute.120  Later, in Baird v. 
State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that a state may not ask questions 
solely to gain information about a person’s political views or associa-
tions.121  According to the Court: “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquir-
ies about a person’s beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First 
Amendment.  Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas, 
as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights 
protected by the Constitution.”122 
Rape shield laws restrict the questioning of rape victims in court.123  
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 limits certain employer inquir-
ies about employee disabilities.124  Many states prohibit employers from 
questioning employees or applicants about certain matters.  For example, 
Wisconsin forbids employers from requiring employees or applicants to un-
dergo HIV testing.125  Massachusetts prohibits employers from asking about 
arrests not leading to conviction, misdemeanor convictions, or any prior 
commitment to mental health treatment facilities.126  Several states restrict 
employers from requiring employees or applicants to undergo genetic test-
ing.127  Evidentiary privileges protect communications between attorneys 
120 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960). 
121 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971).  If the government has other purposes for asking such infor-
mation, however, questions about political views and organizations are permissible.  See Law 
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1971) (re-
marking that questions about membership and intent to further a subversive organization’s 
illegal aims were constitutionally proper); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-28 
(1959) (holding that a person could be compelled to disclose before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee whether he was a member of the Communist Party because questions 
were related to a “valid legislative purpose”). 
122 Baird, 401 U.S. at 6. 
123 See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts:  A 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1986) (discussing how rape 
shield laws reversed the common law doctrine that allowed a defendant to inquire into the 
complainant’s tendency to engage in extramarital sexual relations). 
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000) (limiting the legality of inquiries during the pre-
employment period); id. § 12112(d)(4) (prohibiting inquiries during the employment period).  
Drug testing is not considered a “medical examination” under the ADA.  Id. § 12114(d)(1). 
125 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.15(2) (West 2002). 
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9), (9A) (LexisNexis 1999). 
127 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(o) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
46a-60(11)(A) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(e) (Supp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW § 296.19(a)(1) (McKinney 2004). 
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and clients, priests and penitents, and doctors and patients.128  Privileges do 
not guard against the questioning of the individual about her personal in-
formation; rather, they protect against the questioning of others about it.  As 
Catherine Ross contends, privileges protect against “forced betrayal.”129 
Although the law protects against interrogation, it does so in a compli-
cated and unsystematic way.  The Fifth Amendment’s protection against in-
terrogation is very limited.  The Fifth Amendment certainly does not protect 
the information itself; if the same facts can be produced at trial via other 
witnesses or evidence, they are not prohibited.  The Fifth Amendment is 
therefore concerned only partly with the type of information involved-–its 
applicability turns on compelled self-disclosure.  However, as William 
Stuntz observes, under current Fifth Amendment law: 
As long as use immunity is granted, the government is free to compel even the 
most damning and private disclosures. . . . If the privilege were sensibly de-
signed to protect privacy, . . . its application would turn on the nature of the 
disclosure the government wished to require, and yet settled fifth amendment 
law focuses on the criminal consequences of disclosure.130  
Incriminating information may thus be compelled even under the Fifth 
Amendment if there are no criminal consequences-–even if the compulsion 
would cause a person great disgrace.131  In Ullmann v. United States, for ex-
ample, a witness granted immunity to testify as to his activities in the Com-
munist Party contended that he would not only suffer disgrace, but would 
suffer severe social sanctions as a result, including losing his job and friends 
, and being blacklisted from future employment.132  The Court rejected the 
witness’s argument because no criminal sanctions would be imposed as a 
128 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (2005) (privileging, in civil actions, any 
patient communication to a physician or surgeon regarding “any physical or mental disease or 
disorder or supposed physical or mental disease or disorder or as to any such knowledge ob-
tained by personal examination of the patient”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1995) (“[T]he 
client . . . has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confi-
dential communication between client and lawyer . . . .”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-
803 (West 2005) (rendering privileged any “confession or admission” made to an accredited 
practitioner of a religious denomination in her official capacity). 
129 Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles:  The Parent-
Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85, 86 (2003). 
130 William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1234 
(1988) (footnotes omitted). 
131 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896) (“The design of the constitutional 
privilege [against self-incrimination] is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but 
to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal 
charge.”). 
132 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956). 
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result of his testifying.133  In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the “Fifth 
Amendment was designed to protect the accused against infamy as well as 
against prosecution,” and that the “curse of infamy” could be as damaging 
as criminal punishment.134  Nevertheless, Douglas’s view has not been ac-
cepted in Fifth Amendment doctrine.  It remains unclear what interests the 
Fifth Amendment protects.  As Stuntz observes: “It is probably fair to say 
that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the privilege against 
self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational the-
ory.”135 
Evidentiary privileges, like the Fifth Amendment, are also quite narrow 
in scope.  Despite strong public disapproval of forcing parents and children 
to testify against each other, the majority of courts have rejected a parent-
child privilege.136  Still, in the words of one court, “forcing a mother and fa-
ther to reveal their child’s alleged misdeeds . . . is shocking to our sense of 
decency, fairness and propriety.”137 
Privacy law’s theory of interrogation is not only incoherent, it is nearly 
nonexistent.  Despite recognizing the harms and problems of interrogation-–
compulsion, divulgence of private information, and forced betrayal-–the law 
only addresses them in limited situations. 
B.  Information Processing 
Information processing refers to the use, storage, and manipulation of 
data that has been collected.  Information processing does not involve the 
collection of data; rather, it concerns how already-collected data is handled.  
133 Id. at 439. 
134 Id. at 450, 452 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
135 Stuntz, supra note 130, at 1228. 
136 See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The overwhelming ma-
jority of all courts—federal or state—have rejected such a privilege.”). 
137 In re A & M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (App. Div. 1978).  When Monica Lewinsky’s 
mother was subpoenaed to testify against her by Independent Counsel Ken Starr in his inves-
tigation of President Bill Clinton, there was an enormous public outcry.  See Ruth Marcus, To 
Some in the Law, Starr’s Tactics Show a Lack of Restraint, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at A1 
(providing reactions from prosecutors who believed Starr’s tactics were unwarranted).  Critics 
have likened the tactic of having parents and children testify about each other to some of the 
infamous horrors of totalitarian societies, such as Nazi Germany, where the government 
sought to make family members divulge information about each other.  See, e.g., J. Tyson 
Covey, Making Form Follow Function:  Considerations in Creating and Applying a Statutory 
Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 890 (postulating that recognition of some 
form of a parent-child privilege would help to prevent the state from forcing children and par-
ents into a troubling predicament); Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges:  
Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 590-94 (1987) (not-
ing that parent-child privileges are not recognized in despotic regimes). 
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I will discuss five forms of information processing: (1) aggregation, (2) 
identification, (3) insecurity, (4) secondary use, and (5) exclusion. 
Processing involves various ways of connecting data together and link-
ing it to the people to whom it pertains.  Even though it can involve the 
transmission of data, processing diverges from dissemination because the 
data transfer does not involve the disclosure of the information to the pub-
lic–-or even to another person.  Rather, data is often transferred between 
various record systems and consolidated with other data.  Processing di-
verges from information collection because processing creates problems 
through the consolidation and use of the information, not through the means 
by which it is gathered. 
1.  Aggregation 
The rising use of computers in the 1960s raised public concern about 
privacy.138  Commentators devoted significant attention to the issue,139 and 
privacy became an important topic on Congress’s agenda.140  Significant 
concern was devoted to the data maintained by the federal government.  In 
1965, a group of academics led by professor Richard Ruggles criticized the 
fact that the government’s data systems were decentralized and recom-
mended consolidation.141  The Bureau of the Budget (now called the Office 
of Management and Budget) supported the idea and suggested the creation 
138 REGAN, supra note 43, at 82. 
139 See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 13 (1964) (discussing how life 
in the 1960s brings with it some compulsory encroachments on privacy, but that “‘reasonable’ 
encroachments are fast becoming unreasonable . . . invasions . . . tending to make intrusion a 
way of everyday life”(emphasis omitted)); MILLER, supra note 5, at ix-x (discussing “the pro-
found effect computer technology is certain to have on numerous facets of the law” including 
individual privacy); VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 12 (1964) (“Today it is increas-
ingly assumed that the past and present of all of us . . . must be an open book; and that all such 
information about us can be not only put in files but merchandised freely.”); WESTIN, supra 
note 19, at 3 (arguing that society needs to “move from public awareness of the problem to a 
sensitive discussion of what can be done to protect privacy in an age when so many forces of 
science [and] technology . . . press against it from all sides”); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”:  
Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 343 (1966) (identifying two problems arising from the maintenance 
and usage of computerized personal data files—“access and accuracy” of information—which 
“raise divergent questions for the legal system”); Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and 
Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211-45 (1968) (exploring the possibility and danger of 
National Data Banks, including personal privacy implications). 
140 See REGAN, supra note 43, at 82 (reporting that Congress held many hearings on the 
issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
141 SMITH, supra note 111, at 309. 
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of a Federal Data Center.142  The plan was quickly attacked in Congress and 
scrapped.143  In 1974, the General Services Administration proposed the 
creation of FEDNET, a plan to link together all computer systems main-
tained by the federal government.144  Vice President Ford immediately 
halted the plan.145 
What was the concern?  The data was already in the record systems of 
government agencies.  Why was it a problem for the government to com-
bine it into one gigantic database? 
The problem is one that I have called “aggregation.”146  Aggregation is 
the gathering together of information about a person.  A piece of informa-
tion here or there is not very telling.  But when combined together, bits and 
pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person.  The whole becomes 
greater than the parts.147  This occurs because combining information cre-
ates synergies.  When analyzed, aggregated information can reveal new 
facts about a person that she did not expect would be known about her when 
the original, isolated data was collected. 
Aggregating information is certainly not a new activity.  It was always 
possible to combine various pieces of personal information, to put two and 
two together to learn something new about a person.  But aggregation’s 
power and scope are different in the Information Age; the data gathered 
about people is significantly more extensive, the process of combining it is 
much easier, and the computer technologies to analyze it are more sophisti-
cated and powerful. 
Combining data and analyzing it certainly can be put to beneficial uses.  
Amazon.com, for example, uses aggregated data about a person’s book-
buying history to recommend other books that the person might find of in-
terest.  Credit reporting allows creditors to assess people’s financial reputa-
tions in a world where first-hand experience of the financial condition and 
trustworthiness of individuals is often lacking.148  These developments make 
142 Id. at 310-11.  But cf. Note, Privacy and Efficient Government:  Proposals for a Na-
tional Data Center, 82 HARV. L. REV. 400, 412 (1968) (criticizing the congressional task 
force for undertaking “only a surface treatment” of the privacy issue and arguing that “Con-
gress should give very careful consideration to essential legal and technological safeguards for 
the privacy interest”). 
143 SMITH, supra note 111, at 311. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 44-47. 
147 See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1398 (“A comprehensive collection of data about an 
individual is vastly more than the sum of its parts.”). 
148 See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY:  SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION 
IN AMERICA 73 (1993) (noting that “in a society of strangers . . . so much depends on the faith 
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sense in a world where there are billions of people and word-of-mouth is in-
sufficient to assess reputation. 
Alongside these benefits, however, aggregation can cause dignitary 
harms because of how it unsettles expectations.  People expect certain limits 
on what is known about them and on what others will find out.  Aggregation 
upsets these expectations, because it involves the combination of data in 
new, potentially unanticipated ways to reveal facts about a person that are 
not readily known.  People give out bits of information in different settings, 
only revealing a small part of themselves in each context.  Indeed, people 
selectively spread around small pieces of data throughout most of their daily 
activities, and they have the expectation that in each disclosure, they are re-
vealing relatively little about themselves.  When these pieces are consoli-
dated together, however, the aggregator acquires much greater knowledge 
about the person’s life. 
Like surveillance, aggregation is a way to acquire information about 
people.  It reveals facts about data subjects in ways far beyond anything 
they expected when they gave out the data.  However, aggregation is a less 
direct form of data acquisition than surveillance, for it occurs through proc-
essing data already gathered from individuals. 
Aggregation can also lead to architectural problems; it can increase the 
power that others have over individuals.  The dossier created by aggregating 
a person’s data is often used as a way to judge her.  Aggregations of data, 
such as credit reports, are used to evaluate data about a person’s financial 
reputation and then make decisions that profoundly affect a person’s life, 
including whether she gets a loan, a lease, or a mortgage.  Elsewhere, I have 
discussed the multitude of ways that the compilation of an individual’s 
data–-what I call the “digital person”–-is being used to make important de-
cisions about an individual.  The digital person in digital space increasingly 
is affecting the flesh-and-blood individual in realspace.149 
Although making decisions based on aggregated data is efficient, it also 
creates problems.  Data compilations are often both telling and incomplete.  
They reveal facets of our lives, but the data is often reductive and discon-
nected from the original context in which it was gathered.  This leads to dis-
tortion.  As H. Jeff Smith observes: 
[D]ecisions that were formerly based on judgment and human factors are in-
stead often decided according to prescribed formulas.  In today’s world, this 
response is often characterized by reliance on a rigid, unyielding process in 
we have in one another’s truthfulness,” and that “[l]acking the personal information necessary 
to discern the veracity of others’ claims, we trust instead the monitoring provided by large 
social structures” and institutions such as credit bureaus). 
149 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 1-10. 
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which computerized information is given great weight.  Facts that actually re-
quire substantial evaluation could instead be reduced to discrete entries in pre-
assigned categories.150  
Some courts have recognized aggregation as violating a privacy inter-
est.  In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court concluded that the disclosure of 
FBI “rap sheets” was an invasion of privacy within a privacy exemption of 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).151  Pursuant to FOIA, “any per-
son” may request “records” maintained by an executive agency.152  The rap 
sheets contained extensive information about individuals compiled from a 
variety of criminal records.153  FOIA exempts law enforcement records that 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy.”154  Although the reporters argued that the rap sheets were 
not private because all of the information in them had already been dis-
closed, the Court disagreed, noting that in “an organized society, there are 
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.”155  Thus, 
the Court observed, there is a “distinction, in terms of personal privacy, be-
tween scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet 
and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”156 
Reporters Committee is one of the rare instances where the law has rec-
ognized that aggregation can make a material difference in what is known 
about an individual.  Most courts adhere to the secrecy paradigm, which 
fails to recognize any privacy interest in information publicly available or 
already disseminated to others.157  The Restatement of Torts declares that 
for the tort of publicity given to private life, “[t]here is no liability when the 
defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff 
that is already public.  Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts 
about the plaintiff’s life that are matters of public record.”158  Similarly, the 
Restatement provides that for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, “there is 
150 H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY:  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPO-
RATE AMERICA 121 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
151 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989). 
152 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
153 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 749. 
154 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
155 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763. 
156 Id. at 764. 
157 See, e.g., Cordell v. Detective Publ’ns, 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) 
(“The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff may not complain of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts when the material facts [of concern] are not private but are matters of public record 
and are in the public domain.”). 
158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1965). 
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no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plain-
tiff.”159  In contrast, aggregation would violate a privacy interest when the 
aggregation significantly increases what others know about a person, even if 
originating from public sources. 
Differing from Reporters Committee, courts have refused to find privacy 
interests in compilations of information disclosed in Megan’s Laws, which 
involve the dissemination of personal data about convicted sex-offenders.160  
In Russell v. Gregoire, the court rejected a constitutional challenge to Wash-
ington’s Megan’s Law because the information was not private since it was 
“already fully available to the public.”161  Similarly, in Paul P. v. Verniero, 
the Court declined to follow Reporters Committee in concluding that New 
Jersey’s Megan’s Law was constitutional.162  As one court observed:  “Both 
the Third Circuit and this Court have repeatedly stressed that Reporters 
Committee is inapposite on the issue of those privacy interests entitled to pro-
tection under the United States Constitution.”163  These cases limited Report-
ers Committee to the FOIA context, but they did not supply a reason why rec-
ognizing a privacy interest in aggregated data is necessarily linked only to 
FOIA and does not apply to other areas of law.  Legally, the cases have drawn 
a line, but conceptually, no justification has been offered for the limitation. 
Of course, there are many reasons why Megan’s Laws might outweigh 
privacy interests-–namely, as a means to promote safety of children, to keep 
parents informed of which neighbors to avoid, and to help parents make sure 
that the babysitter they hired is not a prior child molester.  However, Rus-
sell164 and Paul P.165 did not recognize a privacy interest in the aggregated 
data, and thus no balancing took place between this privacy interest and the 
safety interest. 
159 Id. § 652B cmt. c. 
160 See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 
Reporters Committee was not applicable to a Megan’s Law challenge).  But see Doe v. Poritz, 
662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (following Reporters Committee and recognizing a privacy 
interest with respect to a sex offender community-notification statute). 
161 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997). 
162 170 F.3d 396, 400, 405 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d on reh’g sub nom. Paul P. v. Farmer, 
227 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the holding of Reporters Committee dealt with the 
implication of a privacy interest protected by an exemption to the Freedom of Information 
Act, not by the Constitution, as in the case of Paul P.). 
163 A.A. v. New Jersey, 176 F. Supp. 2d 274, 305 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d 341 F.3d 206 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
164 124 F.3d at 1094. 
165 170 F.3d at 405. 
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2.  Identification 
Although proposed many times in the United States, a national identifi-
cation card has been explicitly rejected.  When the Social Security System 
was first developed, “President Roosevelt and members of Congress prom-
ised that the Social Security card would be kept confidential and would not 
be used for identification purposes.”166  The cards even stated that they were 
“not for identification.”167  In 1973, the influential report, Records, Com-
puters, and the Rights of Citizens, concluded: 
We take the position that a standard universal identifier (SUI) should not be es-
tablished in the United States now or in the foreseeable future.  By our defini-
tion, the Social Security Number (SSN) cannot fully qualify as an SUI; it only 
approximates one.  However, there is an increasing tendency for the Social Se-
curity number to be used as if it were an SUI.168  
Why were there strong negative reactions to identification systems?  What 
is the problem with identifying people? 
“Identification” is connecting information to individuals.  According to 
Roger Clarke, identification is “the association of data with a particular hu-
man being.”169  Identification enables us to attempt to verify identity–-that 
the person accessing her records is indeed the owner of the account or the 
subject of the records.  Identification enables us not only to confirm the 
identity of a person, but also to discover the perpetrator of a crime from 
traces left behind, such as fingerprints and genetic material.170 
Identification is related to disclosure in that both involve the revelation 
of true information.  Identification involves a particular form of true infor-
mation (one’s identity), which enables databases of information to be linked 
to people.  Identification is similar to aggregation as both involve the com-
bination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a per-
son.  However, identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link 
166 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 349-50 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
167 Id. at 350. 
168 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xxxii (1973). 
169 ROGER CLARKE, SMART CARD TECHNICAL ISSUES STARTER KIT, ch. 3 (April 8, 
1998), available at  http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/SCTISK3.html.  As 
Clarke observes:  “In the context of information systems, the purpose of identification is more 
concrete:  it is used to link a stream of data with a person.”  Roger Clarke, Human Identifica-
tion in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues, 7 INFO. 
TECH. & PEOPLE 6, 8 (1994), available at http://www.anu.edu.au/ 
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/HumanID.html [hereinafter Clarke, Information Systems]. 
170 For a history of criminal identification techniques, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT 
IDENTITIES:  A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 4-5 (2001). 
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to the person in the flesh.  For example, there can be extensive aggregations 
of data about a person in many databases, but these aggregations might be 
rarely connected to that person as she goes through her day-to-day activities.  
This is a situation involving high aggregation and low identification.  On the 
flip side, one can have high identification and low aggregation, such as in a 
world of checkpoints, where people constantly have to show identification 
but where there are few linkages to larger repositories of data about people. 
Identification has many benefits.171  In order to access various accounts, 
people’s identity must be verified, a step that can reduce fraud and enhance 
accountability.  Identification can deter misleading political campaign ads.  
Under federal election law, television ads advocating the election or defeat 
of a candidate must identify the person or group placing the ad.172  If an ad 
is not authorized by a candidate, it “shall clearly state the name and perma-
nent street address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address of the 
person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is 
not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.”173  Identifica-
tion requirements such as this one can help prevent misinformation and en-
able people to better assess the ad. 
Although identification of people or sources of particular messages can 
be beneficial, it also creates problems.  There are some who argue that iden-
tification is demeaning to dignity because it reduces people to a number or 
to bodily characteristics.174  But, identification is a means to link people to 
data, not necessarily an indication that people are the equivalent of their 
identifying characteristics.  One need not assume that identification equates 
individual identity with the identifiers.  Therefore, I do not agree that identi-
fication is inherently demeaning to dignity. 
There is, nonetheless, a more compelling argument for why identifica-
tion can negatively impact identity.  The problem stems not from the identi-
fier itself but from how it links data to individuals.  Because it connects 
people to data, identification attaches informational baggage to people.  This 
171 See generally JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., BIOMETRICS:  IDENTITY ASSUR-
ANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2003) (commenting that reliable identification improves 
public safety and the safety of business transactions). 
172 See Communications Disclaimer Requirements, 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (2005) (requiring 
disclaimers on “general public political advertising”).  The identification requirement was 
originally part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)), which required 
identification for any expenditure with the purpose of influencing an election.  The Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo held that the provision can only apply to speech that “expressly advocate[s] 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”  424 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1976). 
173 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
174 See Clarke, Information Systems, supra note 169, at 32-34 (describing proponents of 
this view). 
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alters what others learn about people as they engage in various transactions 
and activities.  An interesting example of this was a case before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which enforces the Council of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.175  In B. v. France, a French citizen who had surgically changed 
her sex from male to female sought to have her identification documents 
(birth certificate, identity card, passport, and voting card) changed from list-
ing her former male name to a female one.176  Since gender was “indicated 
on all documents using the identification number issued to everyone” and 
since this “number was used as part of the system of dealings between so-
cial security institutions, employers and those insured,” it prevented her 
from concealing the fact she was a transsexual and effectively assuming a 
female identity.177  As the Commission stated: 
A transsexual was consequently unable to hide his or her situation from a po-
tential employer and the employer’s administrative staff; the same applied to 
the many occasions in daily life where it was necessary to prove the existence 
and amount of one’s income (taking a lease, opening a bank account, applying 
for credit, etc.).  This led to difficulties for the social and professional integra-
tion of transsexuals.178  
The Commission concluded that the applicant, “as a result of the fre-
quent necessity of disclosing information concerning her private life to third 
parties, suffered distress which was too serious to be justified on the ground 
of respect for the rights of others.”179  This case illustrates how identifica-
tion can inhibit people’s ability to change and can prevent their self-
development by tying them to a past from which they want to escape.180 
In some ways, identification resembles interrogation, as identification 
often involves the questioning of individuals to compel them to identify 
themselves.  Identification is a component of certain forms of surveillance 
insofar as it facilitates the detection and monitoring of a person and enables 
surveillance data to be categorized according to the individuals to which it 
pertains. 
175 Article 8 of the Convention provides for the protection of “the right to respect for [an 
individual’s] private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221. 
176 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33, 36 (1992). 
177 Id. at 52. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 The science fiction movie Gattaca also illustrates these points.  Vincent, the protago-
nist, is linked to his high risk of developing heart problems, thus rendering him unfit for all 
but the most menial of jobs.  GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
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Identification is thus interrelated with other forms of privacy disruption, 
and, like those forms, it reveals, distorts, and intrudes.  Identification di-
verges, however, because it is primarily a form of connecting data to people.  
Aggregation creates what I have called a “digital person,” a portrait com-
posed of information fragments combined together.181  Identification goes a 
step further–-it links the digital person directly to a person in realspace. 
Some forms of identification can have similar effects to disclosure.  For 
example, expressive methods of identification, such as branding, tattooing, 
or scarlet letters have been used “usually in the context of slavery, racial 
subjugation or harsh criminal systems.”182  The identification marker con-
veys certain information and often bears a particular stigma.  In contrast, 
nonexpressive means of identification, such as fingerprints, identify people 
without signaling anything to the public. 
Identification also creates architectural problems, for it increases the 
government’s power over individuals.  Identification has been a critical tool 
for governments seeking to round up radicals or disfavored citizens.183  It is 
also an efficient tool for controlling people.  In the United States, passports 
were used to stifle dissent; since Communists during the McCarthy era were 
prohibited from using passports, they were restricted from traveling outside 
the country.184 
Identification can inhibit one’s ability to be anonymous or pseudony-
mous.185  Anonymity and pseudonymity protect people from bias based on 
their identities and enable people to vote, speak, and associate more freely 
by protecting them from the danger of reprisal.186  Anonymity can enhance 
181 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 1. 
182 Clarke, Information Systems, supra note 169, at 20. 
183 As Richard Sobel observes, “[i]dentity systems and documents have a long history of 
uses and abuses for social control and discrimination.”  Richard Sobel, The Degradation of 
Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 48 
(2002).  Indeed, one of the primary reasons that governments created passports and identity 
cards was to restrict movement, alter patterns of migration, and control the movements of poor 
people and others viewed as undesirable.  Marc Garcelon, Colonizing the Subject:  The Gene-
alogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
83, 86 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001). 
184 Sobel, supra note 183, at 49. 
185 Anonymous speech has a long history as an important mode of expression.  Between 
1789 and 1809, numerous Presidents and Congressmen published anonymous political writ-
ings.  SMITH, supra note 111, at 41.  Ben Franklin used over forty pen names during his life.  
Id. at 43.  Indeed, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published the Federalist 
Papers using the pseudonym “Publius.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 
343 n.6 (1995).  The Anti-Federalists also used pseudonyms.  Id. 
186 As Gary Marx notes, anonymity can “facilitate the flow of information and commu-
nication on public issues” and “encourage experimentation and risk taking without facing 
large consequences, risk of failure, or embarrassment since one’s identity is protected.”  Gary 
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the persuasiveness of one’s ideas, for identification can shade reception of 
ideas with readers’ biases and prejudices.  This is why, in many universities 
and schools, exams are graded anonymously.  Anonymity provides people 
with the ability to criticize the companies they work for and to blow the 
whistle.187  Anonymity also protects people who read or listen to certain un-
popular ideas.188 
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that “identifica-
tion and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public 
matters of importance.”189  Thus, requiring the disclosure of identifying in-
formation would chill free speech, violating the First Amendment.  How-
ever, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Court concluded that a 
law requiring people to identify themselves during a police stop did not vio-
late the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.190  In particular, responding to the 
Fifth Amendment challenge, the Court concluded:  “Answering a request to 
disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to 
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”191  However, as Justice 
Stevens wrote in dissent: 
A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, 
particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law en-
forcement databases. And that information, in turn, can be tremendously useful 
in a criminal prosecution. It is therefore quite wrong to suggest that a person’s 
identity provides a link in the chain to incriminating evidence “only in unusual 
circumstances.”192   
T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity:  Some Conceptual Distinctions and Issues for Research, in 
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, supra note 183, at 311, 316, 318 (2001); see also A. 
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean:  Living With Anonymity, Digital 
Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 408 (1996) (“Not everyone is so cou-
rageous as to wish to be known for everything they say, and some timorous speech deserves 
encouragement.”). 
187 One of the most famous examples of an anonymous whistleblower is Deep Throat, 
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s confidential source who helped them unearth the Water-
gate scandal.  See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 71-73, 
130-35 (1974). 
188 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:  A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1012-14 (1996) (arguing that reader 
anonymity is an important First Amendment value and that anonymous reading protects peo-
ple from being associated with the ideas about which they read). 
189 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. 
v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (stating that anonymity protects people 
who engage in “unpopular causes”); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42 (“The decision in favor of 
anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about so-
cial ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”). 
190 542 U.S. 177, 189, 190-91 (2004). 
191 Id. at 191. 
192 Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 191 (majority opinion)). 
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Stevens’s dissent recognizes that the harm of identification is often not in 
the disclosure of the identifying marker (the name, fingerprint, etc.) itself, 
but in the ability to connect this marker to a stream of collected data.  Being 
asked to identify oneself, therefore, is being asked to link oneself to the 
data, not just state a name. 
3.  Insecurity 
Identity theft is the fastest growing white collar crime.193  An identity 
thief opens accounts and conducts fraud in the victim’s name.  As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, identity theft is made possible because we all have “digital 
dossiers”—extensive repositories of personal information about us—that are 
maintained by various companies and institutions.194  The thief taps into a 
person’s dossier, which becomes polluted with discrediting information 
when debts go unpaid, or when the thief uses the person’s identity to com-
mit a crime.  Victims of identity theft are submerged into a bureaucratic hell 
where, according to one estimate, they must spend approximately two years 
and almost 200 hours to decontaminate their dossier.195  While their dossier 
remains defiled, victims have difficulty getting jobs, loans, or mortgages.196 
Identity theft is the overt result of a larger group of problems I call “in-
security.”  Glitches, security lapses, abuses, and illicit uses of personal in-
formation all fall into this category.  Insecurity, in short, is a problem caused 
by the way our information is handled and protected. 
Insecurity is related to aggregation, as it creates risks of downstream 
harm that can emerge from inadequate protection of compendiums of per-
sonal data.  Insecurity is also related to identification—it often occurs be-
cause of difficulties in linking data to people.  As Lynn LoPucki observes, 
identity theft occurs because “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often 
lack both the means and the incentives to correctly identify the persons who 
seek credit from them or on whom they report.”197  In this sense, insecurity 
can be a cost of lack of identification.198 
193 Jennifer 8. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2001, § 3, at 8. 
194 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 110. 
195 JANINE BENNER ET AL., NOWHERE TO TURN:  VICTIMS SPEAK OUT ON IDENTITY 
THEFT, pt. II, §§ 1, 4 (2000), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm. 
196 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 110. 
197 Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 89, 94 (2001). 
198 Identification via password, however, can enhance security without linking the indi-
vidual up to immutable characteristics such as biometric identifiers. 
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Distortion—the dissemination of false information about a person—is 
related to insecurity, since problems with security can result in one’s records 
being polluted with false data.  This can destroy a person’s financial reputa-
tion, which today is based in large part on the records maintained by credit 
reporting agencies.199  Insecurity, therefore, can involve not only a threat of 
disclosure, but also a threat of distortion. 
Insecurity exposes people to potential future harm.  Combating identity 
theft after it happens has proven immensely difficult.200  The careless use of 
data by businesses and the government makes the crime of identity theft in-
credibly easy.  Companies use Social Security numbers (SSNs) as pass-
words, and since SSNs can be readily obtained by identity thieves from pub-
lic records or from database companies, people’s accounts and personal 
information are insecure.201 
In cases involving the constitutional right to privacy, courts have some-
times recognized insecurity as a privacy harm.  In Whalen v. Roe, the Su-
preme Court suggested that the constitutional right to privacy also extended 
to the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”202  As 
the Court observed, the government’s collection of personal data for its re-
cord systems “is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regu-
latory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”203  The Court noted that “in 
some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”204  
Applying Whalen, a federal circuit court in Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia concluded that certain questions on a 
police department employee questionnaire were unconstitutional because 
there were no guidelines about maintaining the security of the informa-
tion.205 
Many privacy statutes require that information be kept secure.  This re-
quirement was proposed in the original Fair Information Practices of 1973:  
“Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their in-
tended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the 
199 See NOCK, supra note 148, at 53 (recounting the rise of credit bureaus).  For a com-
prehensive account of the credit reporting system, see EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & 
CREDIT REPORTS (2004). 
200 See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 111-12 (noting that investiga-
tion and prosecution of identity theft cases is not a top priority for law enforcement agencies, 
and that victims are slow to realize that their identity has been stolen). 
201 Id. at 115-19. 
202 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). 
203 Id. at 605. 
204 Id. 
205 812 F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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data.”206  The Privacy Act of 1974 requires federal agencies maintaining 
personal data to “establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physi-
cal safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of records.”207  The 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act states that websites must protect 
the “confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected 
from children.”208  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires that regulatory 
agencies of financial institutions establish security standards for personal 
information.209  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 requires the promulgation of security standards “to ensure the integrity 
and confidentiality of [medical] information.”210  The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act prohibits hacking into people’s computers.211 
Although the law recognizes injuries when a breach in security results 
in overt harm to an individual, courts are reluctant to find harm simply from 
the insecure storage of information.212  Several privacy statutes attempt to 
avoid problems in measuring harm by providing for minimum liquidated 
damages.213  In many instances, courts ignore insecurity as a problem.  For 
example, in Board of Education v. Earls, a school district in Tecumseh, 
Oklahoma adopted a drug testing policy that required all middle and high 
school students to undergo drug testing before participating in any extracur-
ricular activity.214  Some of the students challenged the policy under the 
Fourth Amendment,  but the Supreme Court upheld the testing.215  The stu-
dents contended that the school was careless in protecting the security of the 
206 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 41. 
207 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2000). 
208 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2000). 
209 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2000).  For the FTC’s security regulations, see 16 
C.F.R. § 314 (2005). 
210 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2000). 
211 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
212 See Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability:  Data Security and Personal Informa-
tion, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 11-12 (Margaret Jane Radin et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=583483 (arguing that the law fails to 
adequately guard sensitive information, and that a reconceptualization of the legal duties in-
formation-keepers owe their customers is necessary). 
213 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) 
(2000) (setting a minimum $1000 fine per violation); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 
18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2000) (setting liquidated damages of $2500 as the minimum amount re-
coverable from a defendant found to have wrongfully disclosed video tape rental or sale re-
cords).  The Privacy Act of 1974 also contains a liquidated damages provision; however, the 
Supreme Court interpreted it to apply only when the plaintiff demonstrates actual damages.  
See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616 (2004) (construing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000)). 
214 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002). 
215 Id. at 827, 838. 
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test results.216  Files were not carefully secured and were left where they 
could be accessed by unauthorized people, such as other students.217  The 
Court dismissed this contention because there were no allegations of any 
improper disclosures.218  What the court failed to recognize is that disclo-
sure differs from insecurity because the harm caused by disclosure is the ac-
tual leakage of information; insecurity is the injury of being placed in a 
weakened state, of being made more vulnerable to a range of future harms.  
Although insecurity increases the possibility of disclosure, courts will often 
not recognize a harm unless there has been actual disclosure. 
4.  Secondary Use 
In 1977, in an attempt to capture people engaged in fraud, the federal 
government began matching its employee records with the records of indi-
viduals receiving federal benefits.219  Some of these government matching 
programs used information obtained from businesses to uncover fraud.220  
These matchings were done electronically through the use of computers, 
and they led to the investigations of millions of people.221  In 1988, Con-
gress passed the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act to regulate 
computer matching.222 
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) in its influential report on the harms caused by computer databases, 
set forth a series of Fair Information Practices, one of which provides that 
“[t]here must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other pur-
poses without his consent.”223  This principle, which has become known as 
the purpose specification principle, has been embodied in various privacy 
216 Id. at 833. 
217 Id. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
218 See id. at 833 (majority opinion) (asserting that because there was no report of a stu-
dent actually viewing another student’s medical record, the carelessness alleged did not rise to 
the level of a privacy intrusion). 
219 REGAN, supra note 43, at 86; Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECH-
NOLOGY AND PRIVACY:  THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Roten-
berg eds., 1997). 
220 See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER:  POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 209-10 
(1988) (citing instances of government agencies—including the Selective Service and the 
IRS—using databases supplied by private businesses to investigate instances of draft-dodging 
and tax fraud). 
221 Id. at 208-11. 
222 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)). 
223 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 41-42 (1973). 
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principles and laws.  The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, requires agen-
cies to inform people of “the principal purpose or purposes for which the 
information is intended to be used” when their information is collected.224  
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 limits the purposes for which credit 
reports can be used.225  The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 makes 
it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal infor-
mation, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted [by the 
Act].”226  Anybody who uses an individual’s personal data obtained from a 
motor vehicle record for an impermissible purpose is subject to civil liabil-
ity.227  The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 requires cable opera-
tors to “destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no 
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.”228  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 places limits on the “reuse” of personal 
data when a company provides it to another company.229  The Video Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1988 has a similar provision for personal information 
collected about video rental customers.230  The Federal Election Campaign 
Act states that records of contributors to political committees are “available 
for public inspection . . . except that any information copied from such re-
ports . . . may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting 
contributions or for commercial purposes.”231  The Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act regulations restrict secondary uses of medical 
information beyond those necessary for treatment, payment, and health care 
operations.232 
What is the concern over secondary uses of information beyond those 
purposes for which it is collected?  Why are there so many legal attempts to 
limit secondary uses of data? 
“Secondary use” is the use of data for purposes unrelated to the pur-
poses for which the data was initially collected without the data subject’s 
consent.  There are certainly many desirable instances of secondary use.  In-
formation might be used to stop a crime or to save a life.  The variety of 
possible secondary uses of data is virtually infinite, and they range from be-
nign to malignant. 
224 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(B) (2000). 
225 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
226 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a) (2000). 
227 18 U.S.C. § 2722 (2000). 
228 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2000). 
229 15 U.S.C. § 6802(c) (2000). 
230 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2000). 
231 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2000). 
232 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (2000). 
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Secondary use can cause problems.  It creates a dignitary harm, as it in-
volves using information in ways to which a person does not consent and 
might not find desirable.  Secondary uses thwart people’s expectations 
about how the data they give out will be used.  People might not give out 
data if they know about a potential secondary use, such as for telemarketing, 
spam, or other forms of intrusive advertising.  Fingerprints of United States 
military recruits originally collected to screen their backgrounds were sent 
to the FBI and incorporated into the FBI’s criminal fingerprint database.233  
Such individuals may not have expected nor desired to have their finger-
prints maintained in a law enforcement database of convicts and criminals.  
Secondary use resembles breach of confidentiality, in that there is a betrayal 
of the person’s expectations when giving out information. 
One argument to the contrary is that people should simply expect that 
their data might be used in different ways when they relinquish it.  Under 
this theory, there is no harm to expectations.  But even with privacy policies 
stating that information might be used in secondary ways, people often do 
not read or understand these policies.  Nor can they appropriately make an 
informed decision about secondary uses since they might have little idea 
about the range of potential uses.  According to Paul Schwartz, this is an 
asymmetry of knowledge problem: 
[I]ndividuals are likely to know little or nothing about the circumstances under 
which their personal data are captured, sold, or processed.  This widespread 
individual ignorance hinders development through the privacy marketplace of 
appropriate norms about personal data use.  The result of this asymmetrical 
knowledge will be one-sided bargains that benefit data processors.234 
The potential for secondary use generates fear and uncertainty over how 
one’s information will be used in the future, creating a sense of powerless-
ness and vulnerability.  In this respect, secondary use resembles the harm 
created by insecurity.  The harm is a dignitary one, emerging from denying 
people control over the future use of their data, which can be used in ways 
that have significant effects on their lives. 
Secondary use also creates architectural problems.  The secondary use 
of information can create problems because the information may not fit as 
well with the new use.  When removed from the original context in which it 
was collected, data can more readily be misunderstood. 
233 Pamela Sankar, DNA-Typing:  Galton’s Eugenic Dream Realized?, in DOCUMENT-
ING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, supra note 183, at  273, 278-79. 
234 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1683. 
  
2006] A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY 521 
 
5.  Exclusion 
Among the Fair Information Practices are three related principles:  (1) 
the existence of record systems cannot be kept secret; (2) an individual must 
be able to “find out what information about him is in a record and how it is 
used”; and (3) an individual must be able to “correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him.”235  Together these principles aim to al-
low individuals to have some knowledge of and input into the records about 
them maintained by government agencies and businesses.  The principles 
require transparency in the record systems and provide individuals with a 
right to ensure that the information is accurate.  What problems or harms are 
caused when people are not informed about the information entities have 
about them? 
I refer to the failure to provide individuals with notice and input about 
their records as exclusion.  There are a number of justifications for exclu-
sion.  Providing notice to people about the uses of their personal informa-
tion and giving them rights to access and correct it can be costly.  Also, 
government agencies might want to keep certain record systems pertaining 
to law enforcement or intelligence confidential so as not to tip off those who 
are being investigated. 
Exclusion, however, creates an architectural problem.  Exclusion re-
duces accountability on the part of government agencies and businesses that 
maintain records about individuals.  Exclusion is also related to insecurity, 
as the lack of accountability often goes hand-in-hand with inadequate secu-
rity in record systems of personal data.  Exclusion is different than insecu-
rity in that exclusion is not primarily a harm caused by the lack of protection 
against data leakage or contamination.  Rather, it is a harm created by being 
shut out from participating in the use of one’s personal data, by not being 
informed about how that data is used, and by not being able to do anything 
to affect how it is used. 
One might contend that exclusion is not a harm in and of itself but is 
merely a factor that leads to downstream harms like information dissemina-
tion.  Exclusion, however, can be harmful even if it does not lead to the dis-
semination of data.  As with secondary use and insecurity, exclusion creates 
a sense of vulnerability and uncertainty in individuals.  An inability to par-
ticipate in the maintenance and use of one’s information can lead to feelings 
of powerlessness and frustration.  Some might argue that there are many as-
pects of life in which we are powerless, and that there is nothing special 
about powerlessness with respect to personal information.  But in a world 
235 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 41. 
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where personal information is increasingly used to make important deci-
sions about our lives, powerlessness in this arena can be significantly trou-
blesome. 
Tort law, by and large, has not recognized exclusion as a harm.  In cer-
tain kinds of special relationships, however, tort law has developed strong 
duties and responsibilities.  The law of fiduciary duties creates special duties 
of accountability within certain relationships.  A fiduciary relationship ex-
ists when one party stands in a special position of power over another per-
son.236  New York Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo described the relation-
ship best when he wrote: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held 
to something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behav-
ior.237 
Fiduciary relationships have been held to protect privacy in certain rela-
tionships.238  In this way, exclusion is related to the harm of breach of con-
fidentiality, which is discussed later in this taxonomy.239  Moreover, in cer-
tain relationships, such as between doctors and patients, fiduciary duties 
require informed consent.  As one court has noted, “in soliciting the pa-
tient’s consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information 
material to the patient’s decision.”240  Therefore, tort law has at least recog-
nized the concept of accountability, although courts have not recognized the 
maintenance of personal information about a person as giving rise to fiduci-
ary obligations.  Such a development is not foreclosed, however, as courts 
236 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (defining a 
fiduciary relationship as one “founded on trust or confidence”). 
237 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
238 For example, the tort of breach of confidentiality protects the privacy of people’s 
communications with their doctors, bankers, lawyers, and others.  See Ind. Nat’l Bank v. 
Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a bank has a duty not to 
disclose customer information unless it is to someone with a legitimate public interest); Kohn 
v. Schiappa, 656 A.2d 1322, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (allowing a claim of negli-
gence where an attorney harmed a client by disclosing confidential information); Biddle v. 
Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (recognizing a cause of action when 
physicians breach confidentiality); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1997) (same).  Jessica Litman proposes that the breach of confidentiality tort apply to 
companies that trade in personal information.  Jessica Litman, Information Pri-
vacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1304-13 (2000). 
239 See infra Part C.1. 
240 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (en banc). 
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“have carefully refrained from defining instances of fiduciary relations in 
such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded.”241 
The primary legal protection against exclusion is statutory.  Federal pri-
vacy statutes guard against exclusion by mandating transparency and grant-
ing individuals the right to access their information.  For example, the Pri-
vacy Act provides people the right to access their records.242  So do the 
Cable Communications Policy Act,243 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,244 and 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.245  Several privacy statutes 
allow people a mechanism to demand the correction of inaccurate informa-
tion in their records.246  While these statutes stop short of requiring in-
formed consent, they do give people some ability to discover the informa-
tion gathered about them. 
Some statutes also allow people to opt out of certain uses of informa-
tion.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, allows people to refuse to 
allow financial institutions to share their data with third parties.247  The opt-
out right, which assumes consent unless an individual affirmatively indi-
cates a preference for not sharing the information, does not ensure that con-
sent is informed beyond providing customers with notice that information 
may be shared.  Accordingly, it would most likely fail to constitute in-
formed consent within a fiduciary relationship. 
C.  Information Dissemination 
Thus far, I have discussed harms arising out of the collection of infor-
mation as well as harms arising from the storage and use of data.  “Informa-
tion dissemination” is one of the broadest groupings of privacy harms.  
These harms consist of the revelation of personal data or the threat of 
spreading information.  This group includes  (1) breach of confidentiality, 
(2) disclosure, (3) exposure, (4) increased accessibility, (5) blackmail, (6) 
appropriation, and (7) distortion. 
241 Swerhun v. Gen. Motors Corp., 812 F. Supp. 1218, 1222 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (quoting 
Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 421 (Fla. 1927)). 
242 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000). 
243 47 U.S.C. § 551(d) (2000). 
244 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (2000). 
245  Id. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(i). 
246 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A). 
247 See id. § 6802(b). 
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1.  Breach of Confidentiality 
Mrs. McCormick was involved in a contentious divorce and custody 
battle with her husband.  McCormick’s doctor gave a letter to her husband 
that stated that McCormick was suffering from “major depression and alco-
holism, acute and chronic.”248  McCormick sued her doctor.  According to 
the court, a “majority of the jurisdictions faced with the issue have recog-
nized a cause of action against a physician for the unauthorized disclosure 
of confidential information unless the disclosure is compelled by law or is in 
the patient’s interest or the public interest.”249  Unlike the tort of public dis-
closure, the tort of breach of confidentiality does not require that the disclo-
sure be “highly offensive.”250  The court reasoned that the public disclosure 
tort “focuses on the content, rather than the source of the information.  The 
unauthorized revelation of confidential medical information should be pro-
tected without regard to the degree of its offensiveness.”251  The tort of 
breach of confidentiality applies not only to physicians, but also to bankers 
and other professionals who maintain relationships of trust.252  Additionally, 
some courts have extended liability to third parties who induce the physi-
cian to disclose.253 
Why does the law recognize a separate cause of action for breach of 
confidentiality?  Why not rectify such harms with the tort of public disclo-
sure? 
The answer, I posit, is that disclosure and breach of confidentiality 
cause different kinds of injuries.  Both involve the revelation of secrets 
about a person, but breaches of confidentiality also violate the trust in a spe-
cific relationship.  In this way, the tort emerges from the concept of a fidu-
248 McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 432 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). 
249 Id. at 435 (citations omitted). 
250 Id. at 438. 
251 Id. 
252 See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (recog-
nizing a breach of confidentiality tort for disclosure by a bank).  For more information on the 
breach of confidentiality tort, see generally Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence:  An 
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1426 (1982) (identifying “the present contours of 
the . . . tort” and proposing a general rule for its application).  Interestingly, England, which 
does not recognize the privacy torts, does recognize breach of confidence, which has become 
the country’s central means of protecting privacy.  RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY AND PRESS 
FREEDOM 48-58 (1995).  Unlike the American version, which applies only in a few narrow 
contexts (mainly to the patient-physician relationship), the English tort applies much more 
generally and extends even to spouses and lovers.  Id. at 51. 
253 See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (hold-
ing an insurance company liable for inducing a physician to disclose confidential informa-
tion). 
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ciary relationship, which is “founded on trust or confidence reposed by one 
person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”254 
The harm from a breach of confidence, then, is not simply that informa-
tion has been disclosed, but that the victim has been betrayed.  When it rec-
ognized a cause of action for breach of confidentiality in 1920, the court in 
Simonsen v. Swenson noted that “the physician is bound, . . . upon his own 
professional honor and the ethics of his high profession, to keep secret [a 
patient’s information]. . . . A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a be-
trayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for the damages natu-
rally flowing from such wrong.”255 
Protection against breach of confidentiality helps promote certain rela-
tionships that depend upon trust.  The disclosure tort also protects relation-
ships of trust, but disclosure must result in the release of embarrassing se-
crets or discrediting data before courts will consider it to be harmful.256  
Breach of confidentiality requires only a betrayal of trust, regardless of the 
nature of the data revealed. 
There are certainly instances where we might find the breach of confi-
dentiality desirable.  In Simonsen, for example, the court concluded that a 
doctor should not be held liable for disclosing the fact that a patient had 
syphilis, which at the time was believed to be a highly contagious disease.257  
The court held that protecting public health outweighed any privacy interest 
the plaintiff might have.258  Likewise, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, a psychotherapy patient murdered a young woman with 
whom he was obsessed.259  The court concluded that the patient’s psycho-
therapist had a duty to the woman because he had knowledge that his patient 
posed a danger to her: 
[T]he therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confi-
dence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even 
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy 
of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threat-
ened danger.260 
The law, however, is inconsistent in its recognition of breach of confi-
dentiality as a harm.  Fourth Amendment law fails altogether to recognize 
the breach of confidentiality as a harm.  In United States v. Miller, federal 
254 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972). 
255 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920). 
256 See infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text. 
257 177 N.W. at 831. 
258 Id. at 832. 
259 551 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
260 Id. at 347. 
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law enforcement officials issued subpoenas to two banks to produce a cus-
tomer’s financial records.261  The banks complied with the subpoenas, but 
the customer was not notified of the disclosure of the records until later in 
the course of prosecution.262  The defendant contended that the subpoenas 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.263  The Court concluded, however, 
that the customer lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial 
records maintained by his bank.264  According to the Court, “the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”265  Moreover, 
the Court contended, “[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial 
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed 
to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.”266 
A few years later, the Court employed similar reasoning in Smith v. 
Maryland, where it held that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the phone numbers they dial because people “know that they must convey 
numerical information to the phone company” and, therefore, they cannot 
“harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain se-
cret.”267 
Miller and Smith are the leading cases in what has become known as the 
“third party doctrine.”268  This doctrine provides that if information is pos-
sessed or known by third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the infor-
mation.  In the Information Age, much of what we do is recorded by third 
parties.269  The third party doctrine therefore places an extensive amount of 
personal information outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.270 
The third party doctrine is based on the secrecy paradigm:  since others 
know the information, it is no longer completely secret.  But the fact that the 
information is known to third parties would not be relevant to the Court’s 
analysis if the harm were understood to be a breach of confidentiality.  
261 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (limited by Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3421 (2000)).  
262 Id. at 438. 
263 Id. at 438-39. 
264 Id. at 442. 
265 Id. at 443. 
266 Id. at 442. 
267 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
268 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 201. 
269 See id. at 202-09 (discussing the consequences of applying outdated privacy protec-
tion schemes to modern times). 
270 Id. at 201-02. 
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When people establish a relationship with banks, Internet service providers, 
phone companies, and other businesses, they are not disclosing their infor-
mation to the world.  They are giving it to a party with implicit (and often 
explicit) promises that the information will not be disseminated.271 
Unlike Fourth Amendment law, tort law recognizes breach of confiden-
tiality as a distinct harm.  The breach of confidentiality tort applies to the 
patient-physician relationship and to other relationships as well.  As men-
tioned previously, some courts have held that the tort applies to banks.272  In 
Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, the court observed:  “All agree that a 
bank should protect its business records from the prying eyes of the public, 
moved by curiosity or malice.  No one questions its right to protect its fidu-
ciary relationship with its customers, which, in sound banking practice, as a 
matter of common knowledge, is done everywhere.”273  Not divulging cus-
tomers’ financial information to others “is an implied term of the contract 
between a banker and his customer.”274  Moreover, the court reasoned:  “In-
violate secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of the rela-
tionship of the bank and its customers or depositors.”275 Many other courts 
have agreed.276 
 
2.  Disclosure 
The law has developed a number of protections against disclosures of 
true information about people.  The tort of public disclosure of private facts, 
inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s article, creates a cause of action for one 
who publicly discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive to a reason-
271 See, e.g., Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929) (finding an “implied obliga-
tion” on banks to keep customers’ bank records confidential until compelled by a court to dis-
close them). 
272 See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
273 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (quoting United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Mobile, 
67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946)). 
274 Id. at 290 (quoting 7 AM. JUR. Banks § 196 (1937)). 
275 Id. 
276 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of W. Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 926 (Fla. 1986) (recog-
nizing that banks establish fiduciary relationships with customers when they enter into trans-
actions); Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding an 
implied contract not to disclose personal financial information between a bank and its custom-
ers); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (“[A] bank 
implicitly warrants to maintain, in strict confidence, information regarding its depositor’s af-
fairs.”); Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. 1976) (recog-
nizing a duty of confidentiality for banks); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998) (finding a duty for a bank to keep its customers’ account information confi-
dential). 
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able person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.”277  In Whalen 
v. Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that the “right to privacy” based on 
substantive due process also encompassed the “individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters.”278  Although this branch of the right to 
privacy has not received much further elaboration by the Court, it is recog-
nized in many circuits, where it can enable plaintiffs to sue government of-
ficials for disclosing personal information.279  Further, a number of statutes 
restrict disclosure of information from government records,280 school re-
cords,281 cable company records,282 video records,283 motor vehicle re-
cords,284 and health records.285  Various states have restricted the disclosure 
of particular forms of information, such as medical data and alcohol and 
drug abuse.286 
Why does the law protect people against the disclosure of true informa-
tion about them?  Some critics of such protections contend that they infringe 
upon free speech.  Eugene Volokh argues that “the right to information pri-
vacy—my right to control your communication of personally identifiable 
information about me—is a right to have the government stop you from 
speaking about me.”287  Others have charged that protection against disclo-
277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 21, at 195-96. 
278 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977). 
279 See, e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (hold-
ing that it was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to information privacy for po-
lice to disclose to neighbors that the plaintiff’s husband was infected with AIDS). 
280 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2000) (prohibiting agencies from dis-
closing information about an individual without her prior written consent). 
281 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) 
(2000) (requiring educational agencies or institutions that receive government funding not to dis-
close education records without written consent). 
282 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 551(b)-(c) (2000) (limit-
ing the extent to which a cable service may collect or disclose personally identifiable information 
about subscribers). 
283 See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2000) (creating civil 
liability for video stores that disclose personally identifiable information about any customer). 
284 See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000) (restrict-
ing the use of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records). 
285 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1320d-2 (2000) (protecting the privacy of personal health information in transactions). 
286 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1990) (repealed 1995) 
(prohibiting, inter alia, disclosure of HIV test results); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKin-
ney 2001) (permitting the release of medical records of minors relating to sexually transmitted 
diseases and abortion upon written request, but prohibiting the disclosure to parents without 
consent); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1690.108 (West 1990) (prohibiting the disclosure of all re-
cords prepared during alcohol or drug abuse treatment). 
287 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troubling Impli-
cations of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 
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sure inhibits our ability to judge others and determine whether they are wor-
thy of our trust.  According to Richard Posner, disclosure protections pro-
vide people the “power to conceal information about themselves that others 
might use to their disadvantage.”288 
“Disclosure” occurs when certain true information about a person is re-
vealed to others.  Disclosure differs from breach of confidentiality because 
the harm in disclosure involves the damage to reputation caused by the dis-
semination; the harm with breach of confidentiality is the violation of trust 
in the relationship.289  Disclosure can harm even if the information is re-
vealed by a stranger.  In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis took 
issue with the argument that express or implied contractual duties of confi-
dentiality could adequately protect privacy.290  In particular, they noted that 
strangers were increasingly able to gather personal information: 
The narrower doctrine [of breach of contract] may have satisfied the demands 
of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have 
arisen without violating a contract or a special confidence; but now that mod-
ern devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs 
without any participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the 
law must be placed upon a broader foundation.291  
Warren and Brandeis pointed to new technologies of photography.  
Previously, cameras were large and expensive, and people had to sit and 
pose for their picture to be taken.  This gave rise to a relationship with im-
plicit contractual terms.  But the invention of the “snap camera,” a smaller 
camera that could take candid photographs, “rendered it possible to take pic-
tures surreptitiously.”292  This led Warren and Brandeis to conclude that 
“the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required 
protection.”293 
Although protecting against disclosure does limit freedom of speech, 
disclosure can inhibit the very interests free speech protects.  Protection 
from disclosure, like free speech, promotes individual autonomy.  The risk 
of disclosure can prevent people from engaging in activities that further 
(2000); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 556 (1970) 
(“[T]he right of privacy depends upon guaranteeing an individual freedom from intrusion and 
freedom to think and believe, not freedom from discussion of his opinions, actions or af-
fairs.”). 
288 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1983). 
289 See supra Part C.1. 
290 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 210. 
291 Id. at 210-11. 
292 Id. at 211. 
293 Id. 
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their own self-development.294  Second, as with free speech, disclosure pro-
tections further democratic self-governance.  A substantial amount of politi-
cal discourse does not occur on public soap boxes, but rather in private con-
versations.295  Disclosure can inhibit people from associating with others, 
impinging upon freedom of association, and can also destroy anonymity, 
which is sometimes critical for the promotion of free expression.296 
Disclosure can also threaten people’s security.  For example, many 
people have good reason to keep their addresses secret, including victims of 
stalking and domestic abuse attempting to hide from those that threaten 
them, police officers and prosecutors fearing retaliation by criminals, celeb-
rities desiring to avoid harassment by paparazzi, and doctors who perform 
abortions desiring to protect their family’s safety.  People want to protect 
information that makes them vulnerable or that can be used by others to 
harm them physically, emotionally, financially, and reputationally.  For ex-
ample, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a deranged man was obsessed with 
Amy Lynn Boyer.297  He purchased Boyer’s Social Security number and 
employment address from a database company called Docusearch.  The man 
went to Boyer’s workplace and murdered her.  The court concluded that 
“threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk 
of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal in-
formation to a client.”298 
In many instances, disclosure of information about a person will not en-
hance our ability to judge her; in fact, it can distort our assessments.299  
Knowing bits and pieces of gossip about a person will often not paint a 
more complete portrait; it can lead to misimpressions and condemnation 
without full understanding.  Disclosure protections also guard against irra-
294 See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less:  Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 990-92 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Virtues]. 
295 Id. at 994. 
296 See id. at 995 (“Protection against disclosure protects freedom of association, for it 
enables people to join together and exchange information without having to fear loss of em-
ployment, community shunning, and other social reprisals.” (footnote omitted)). 
297 816 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (N.H. 2003). 
298 Id. at 1008. 
299 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE:  THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 200 (2000) (“[C]hanges in media technology have increased the risk of mistaking 
information for knowledge.”); Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2063, 2068-69 (2001) (arguing that access to limited amounts of information only “creates the 
impression of knowledge”); Solove, Virtues, supra note 294, at 1037  (“Much misunderstand-
ing occurs because of the disclosure of private information . . . .”). 
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tional judgment based on stereotypes of misinformation about diseases.300  
Likewise, society may want to inhibit certain rational judgments, such as 
employment decisions based on genetic information.  Even if employers are 
correct that a prospective employee with a genetic risk for developing a cer-
tain condition is, on balance, riskier to hire than a prospective employee 
without such a predisposition, even such a rational discriminatory employ-
ment decision has its costs.  Such decisions may penalize people for things 
they cannot control and deter people from learning their genetic makeup.301 
Disclosure can also be harmful because it makes a person a “prisoner of 
[her] recorded past.”302  People grow and change, and disclosures of infor-
mation from their past can inhibit their ability to reform their behavior, to 
have a second chance, or to alter their life’s direction.  Moreover, when in-
formation is released publicly, it can be used in a host of unforeseeable 
ways, creating problems related to those caused by secondary use. 
The law often protects against disclosure when the information is kept 
secret but not when others know about it.  As one court observed, appearing 
in public “necessarily involves doffing the cloak of privacy which the law 
protects.”303  In Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., the court held that a hus-
band and wife wrongfully arrested in public had no privacy interest against 
the broadcast of video footage of the arrest because it was filmed in public 
and was “left open to the public eye.”304 Moreover, if a fact about a person 
is known to others, many courts conclude that it is no longer private.  This 
was the case in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., where newspapers 
“outed” Oliver Sipple, who heroically saved President Ford from an assas-
sination attempt.305  The court concluded that his sexuality was not private 
because it was well known in the gay community.306  In Duran v. Detroit 
News, Inc., a former Colombian judge was attempting to lay low because of 
death threats and a bounty placed on her head by a drug lord.307  When a 
newspaper disclosed her address, a court found no privacy interest because 
300 See Solove, Virtues, supra note 294, at 1041-42 (describing the stigma attached to 
those with certain diseases and illnesses). 
301 Cf. id. at 1042-43. 
302 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 112. 
303 Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
304 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 
574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
305 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Ct. App. 1984). 
306 Id. at 669 (“[P]rior to the publication of the newspaper articles in question [Sipple]’s 
homosexual orientation and participation in gay community activities had been known by 
hundereds of people in a variety of cities . . . .”). 
307 504 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).   
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she had revealed it to a few people.308  A few courts, however, have come to 
different conclusions regarding whether there is a privacy interest in infor-
mation communicated to others.  For example, in Times Mirror Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, the identity of a murder witness was disclosed in a newspaper 
article.309  Although the witness had confided in a few friends and family 
members, she had not “rendered otherwise private information public by 
cooperating in the criminal investigation and seeking solace from friends 
and relatives.”310 
Lior Strahilevitz aptly observes that disclosure involves spreading in-
formation beyond existing networks of information flow.311  The harm of 
disclosure is not so much the elimination of secrecy as it is the spreading of 
information beyond expected boundaries.  People often disclose information 
to a limited circle of friends, and they expect the information to stay within 
this group.  Some courts, however, focus on secrecy and do not examine 
people’s expectations of information flow.312 
3.  Exposure 
In an 1881 case, DeMay v. Roberts, a young unmarried man accompa-
nied a doctor into the room where the doctor was assisting a woman in la-
bor.313  The court held that the young man had no business being in the 
room:  “It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propriety to 
doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford an ample rem-
edy.”314  Why is it “shocking” for a stranger to watch a woman give birth to 
a baby? 
308 Id. at 720 (finding her identity to be “open to the public eye” because her work in 
Colombia had been disclosed in newspaper articles, and because she had occasionally used 
her real name in the United States); see also Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 578 
N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (holding that the disclosure of a public conversation be-
tween a plaintiff and her fellow employees was not a privacy violation). 
309 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (Ct. App. 1988). 
310 Id. at 561; see also Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 500 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s disclosure of his infection status to family, friends, and 
members of an HIV support group did not render the information public); Y.G. v. Jewish 
Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that disclosure to doctors and other 
participants of the plaintiff’s in vitro fertilization did not render that information public). 
311 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
919, 974 (2005) (arguing that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy where 
there is a low risk that the information will spread beyond the individual’s social network). 
312 See id. at 943-45 (describing “hard-line” cases in which plaintiffs’ limited disclosures 
barred their privacy claims). 
313 9 N.W. 146, 146 (Mich. 1881). 
314 Id. at 148-49. 
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In 2004, in National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, the 
Supreme Court rejected a request under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) for autopsy photos of Vincent Foster, Jr., a deputy counsel to Presi-
dent Clinton who had committed suicide by shooting himself.315  The Court 
concluded that the photos fell under the exemption for records that “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”316  The Court contended:  “Family members have a personal stake 
in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public 
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the 
rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once 
their own.”317 
Why is it indecent to publish autopsy photographs?  What harm does it 
cause the families?  Imagine that a newspaper prints candid photographs of 
a person naked or of a person defecating.  The person would likely be ap-
palled.  But why?  We all have genitals.  We all defecate.  There are no big 
surprises here. 
These are all illustrations of a disruption I call “exposure.”  Exposure 
involves the exposing to others of certain physical and emotional attributes 
about a person.  These are attributes that people view as deeply primordial, 
and their exposure often creates embarrassment and humiliation.  Grief, suf-
fering, trauma, injury, nudity, sex, urination, and defecation all involve pri-
mal aspects of our lives—ones that are physical, instinctual, and neces-
sary.318  We have been socialized into concealing these activities.319 
Although exposure is similar to disclosure—both involve the dissemi-
nation of true information—they diverge in an important respect.  Exposure 
is related to disclosure in that concealed information is revealed to others, 
but the information is not revealing of anything we typically use to judge 
people’s character.  Unlike disclosure, exposure rarely reveals any signifi-
315 541 U.S. 157, 175 (2004). 
316 Id. at 171 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000))(internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
317 Id. at 168.  Courts have also allowed tort suits based on the dissemination of autopsy 
photos.  See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339-42 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding 
that relatives of deceased persons maintained a cause of action for invasion of privacy when 
coroner’s office employees disseminated autopsy photos). 
318 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 177 (1999) 
(“Sex is an area in which we encounter our desires, prejudices and shame, and cloak these 
emotions in privacy.”). 
319 See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 114 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1994) 
(1939) (“The social reference of shame and embarrassment recedes more and more from con-
sciousness.  Precisely because the social command not to show oneself exposed or performing 
natural functions now operates with regard to everyone[,] . . . it seems to the adult a command 
of his own inner self . . . .”). 
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cant new information that can be used in the assessment of a person’s char-
acter or personality. 
Exposure creates injury because we have developed social practices to 
conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or disgusting.  Further, in 
certain activities, we are vulnerable and weak, such as when we are nude or 
going to the bathroom.  Norms about nudity and bodily functions have 
changed throughout history.320  Martha Nussbaum points out that ancient 
Romans used toilets whereas “courtiers in Elizabethan England urinated and 
defecated in corners of palaces, until the stench made it necessary to change 
residences.”321  In various cultures and at different times in history, levels of 
reticence and modesty concerning the body have differed greatly.322  To-
day’s norms and practices, however, call for the concealment of many as-
pects of the body, bodily functions, and strong displays of emotion.  We 
protect against the exposure of these bodily aspects because this protection 
safeguards human dignity as defined by modern society.  Dignity is a part of 
being civilized; it involves the ability to transcend one’s animal nature.323 
The need for privacy, and therefore the prevention of exposure, is cre-
ated by the fact that we have social relationships and concomitant norms of 
dignity and decorum.324  “The private arises as a necessary space for the 
production of civilized behavior,” William Ian Miller contends.325  “Private 
space enables a civilized public space.”326 
320 See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1135-36 (observing that pub-
lic bathing was common in the Middle Ages, but that by the sixteenth century concealment of 
the body had become the norm). 
321 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:  DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE 
LAW 115-16 (2004). 
322 See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1135-36 (comparing ancient 
Greece, where public nudity was seen as a sign of strength, to Renaissance Europe, where 
“among the wealthy . . . people tried to distance themselves from their body and other’s bod-
ies”). 
323 See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 177 (1997) (“The civilizing 
process, according to [Norbert] Elias, means the expansion of the private sphere at the ex-
pense of the public.  The new norms demand private spaces in which one prepares, grooms, 
and does the things that would disgust others if they were to be witnessed.”); CARL D. 
SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY 49 (W.W. Norton 1992) (1977) (“The open 
display of bodily functions—defecating, great pain, the process of dying—threatens the dig-
nity of the individual, revealing an individual vulnerable to being reduced to his bodily exis-
tence, bound by necessity.”). 
324 Certain activities, such as defecation, we view as uncivilized to perform in front of 
others.  As William Ian Miller observes:  “Clearly defecation is degrading and contaminating.  
It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place.  And to violate those rules is a 
cause for disgrace and shame . . . .”  MILLER, supra note 323, at 147 (footnote omitted). 
325 Id. at 178. 
326 Id. 
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When these practices are disrupted by exposure, people can experience 
a severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem.  
Exposure thus impedes a person’s ability to participate in society.  Even 
though most people would not view a victim of exposure as a lesser person 
or as being less civilized, victims feel that way.  This is in contrast to disclo-
sure, where information often alters the way a person is perceived. 
Disclosure is a power that controls through the imposition of social 
sanctions and condemnation.  Exposure works in a different way, by strip-
ping people of their dignity.327  Exposure interacts with powerful and potent 
social norms.  When people willingly transgress these norms, society has a 
strong interest in shaming them, and it is socially beneficial for these norms 
to be internalized and to result in feelings of shame.  However, exposure in-
volves people unwillingly placed in transgression of these norms.  We do 
not view the victims as blameworthy, and there is little social value in their 
suffering.  Nevertheless, due to the internalization of these norms, exposure 
victims experience strong feelings of shame. 
Tort law does not recognize a separate cause of action for exposure; the 
tort of public disclosure covers both disclosure and exposure.328  Generally, 
exposure cases have fared better than ones involving disclosure.329  For ex-
ample, in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, air jets blew up a woman’s 
dress while she was at a county fair, exposing her underwear.330  At that 
very moment, a photographer for the local newspaper took her photograph, 
and the picture was printed on the front page of the paper.331  The woman 
sued under the public disclosure tort.332  The newspaper contended that the 
picture was taken in public, and that, accordingly, there was no privacy in-
terest.333  This reasoning was based on the secrecy paradigm—that once 
something is disclosed to the public, it is no longer secret.  However, the 
court concluded that the woman still had a right to be protected from “an 
327 One victim of Chicago’s invasive strip search policy testified that “the incident 
caused her emotional distress that manifested itself in reduced socializing, poor work per-
formance, paranoia, suicidal feelings, depression, and an inability to disrobe in any place other 
than a closet.”  Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1985). 
328 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977). 
329 Eugene Volokh explains that this difference may be because the information revealed 
via exposure is less useful to those to whom the information is given than that revealed via 
disclosure.  Volokh, supra note 287, at 1094. 
330 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964). 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 476-77. 
333 Id. at 477. 
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indecent and vulgar” violation of privacy under the tort of public disclo-
sure.334 
Failing to distinguish between disclosure and exposure has adversely 
affected the recognition of exposure harms in some instances.  In McNa-
mara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., for example, a newspaper published a 
picture of a high school athlete whose genitalia was accidentally exposed 
while playing soccer.335  The student sued under the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts.336  According to the student, “the Newspaper violated the 
bounds of public decency.”337  The court conceptualized the injury as one of 
disclosure and concluded that the picture was not private because “[the stu-
dent] was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport at a public place.”338  
The harm in this case, however, is more appropriately classified as one of 
exposure.  Had the court conceptualized the disruption as one of exposure, 
the fact that it occurred in a public place would have been much less rele-
vant to the analysis. 
4.  Increased Accessibility 
The federal courts, along with many state courts and agencies, are de-
veloping systems to place their records online.339  These records are readily 
available at local courthouses or government offices.  Nevertheless, placing 
them online has given rise to an extensive debate over privacy.  Some argue 
that the information is already publicly available, and that therefore it 
should be available on the Internet in the same manner as it is in physical 
form at the localities.  But many administrative bodies charged with exam-
ining the issue have hesitated because of the increased accessibility the 
Internet will bring.  The federal Judicial Conference Committee concluded, 
for example, that “any benefits of public remote electronic access to crimi-
nal files were outweighed by the safety and law enforcement risks such ac-
cess would create.”340 
334 Id. at 478. 
335 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. App. 1991). 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 905. 
338 Id. 
339 See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 131-32 (observing that digital 
filing requirements and the conversion of paper files to digital format will lead to significant 
online accessibility of court records). 
340 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., REPORT ON 
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/ 
Policy.htm. 
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If the information is already available to the public, then what is the 
harm in increasing its accessibility?  Increased accessibility does not involve 
a direct disclosure.  Secret information is not disclosed.  Rather, information 
that is already available to the public is made easier to access.  Unlike dis-
closure, the harm is not a direct revealing of information to another.  Confi-
dentiality is not breached; the cat is already out of the bag.  With increased 
accessibility, a difference in quantity becomes a difference in quality—it 
enhances the risk of the harms of disclosure. 
Increased accessibility to personal information has many benefits.  It 
enhances openness, allowing people to locate information that they are 
seeking more easily.  Ready accessibility of records enables attorneys to 
track down people’s addresses to serve process.  It can assist in investigat-
ing the background of a person that one is planning to hire as a child care-
giver or teacher.  As Robert Gellman notes:  “Some basic functions and in-
stitutions depend on the public availability of records to operate.  The U.S. 
system of land ownership relies on the public availability of records, al-
though that has not always been the case.  The public availability of bank-
ruptcy records is also integral to the process.”341 
Increased accessibility, however, creates problems such as the increased 
possibility of disclosure.  Information can readily be exploited for purposes 
other than those for which it was originally made publicly accessible.  For 
example, companies are gathering data from public records to use for com-
mercial and marketing purposes or to create dossiers on individuals for pro-
filing and other analysis.342  As Peter Winn notes, increased access to court 
records will cause harms to participants in the judicial system:  “They will 
lose . . . their interest in privacy—their identities will be subject to potential 
misuse by thieves, and their children may be exposed to sexual preda-
tors.”343 
Under the secrecy paradigm, courts often view privacy as a binary 
status—information is either completely private or completely public.344  
Accordingly, once information is released into the public domain, it is no 
longer private.  According to the Restatement, for the tort of public disclo-
sure, “[t]here is no liability when the defendant merely gives further public-
341 Robert Gellman, Public Records, Public Policy, and Privacy, HUMAN RTS., Winter 
1999, at 7, 9. 
342 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 131-32; see also Gellman, supra 
note 341, at 7 (warning that although “[p]rivacy protections were inherent in the technology of 
paper,” digitization has led to increased accessibility). 
343 Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records:  Balancing Judicial Accountability and Pri-
vacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 315 (2004). 
344 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of the secrecy para-
digm. 
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ity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.”345  For the harm 
of increased accessibility, however, prior publicity is not dispositive.  One 
must focus on the extent to which the information is made more accessible.  
Most courts, however, due to their commitment to the secrecy paradigm, 
struggle with recognizing this harm.346  In Walls v. City of Petersburg, for 
example, public employees were compelled to answer a questionnaire ask-
ing about the criminal histories of their family members, their complete 
marital history, their children, and their financial status.347  The court dis-
missed their claim that their constitutional right to information privacy was 
violated, reasoning that there was no privacy interest in the information be-
cause it was already available in public records.348 
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court recognized the problem of in-
creased accessibility.349  Earlier in this Article, I noted how this case also 
recognized the problem of aggregation when the Court concluded that the 
disclosure of FBI “rap sheets” violated a cognizable privacy interest under 
FOIA.350  In addition to concluding that there was a difference between 
scattered pieces of information and a fully assembled dossier, the Court rec-
ognized that “there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, 
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized sum-
mary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”351  Here, the Court 
has recognized the harm of increased accessibility.352 
345 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). 
346 See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the constitu-
tional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure of police records because 
“one’s criminal history is arguably not a private ‘personal matter’ at all, since arrest and con-
viction information are matters of public record”); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 
268-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that “an individual cannot expect to have a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in matters of public record” but that plaintiff’s HIV status was not a 
matter of public record); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that because information about the victim’s claims of spousal abuse potentially 
“would have wound up on the public record,” the victim did not have a privacy interest in the 
claims). 
347 895 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1990). 
348 Id. at 193-94. 
349 See 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (observing that the “practical obscurity” of a rap sheet 
is an important element in personal privacy). 
350 See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. 
351 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764. 
352 Id. at 780. 
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5.  Blackmail 
In nineteenth-century England, sodomy was a serious offense.  Al-
though no longer a capital offense—as it had been in the seventeenth cen-
tury—sodomy still carried harsh penalties from ten years to life in prison.353  
Blackmailers would threaten wealthy elites with disclosure of their homo-
sexual activities unless the blackmailers were paid handsomely.  The law 
began to recognize that such forms of extortion should be criminalized.  
When a blackmail case came to court, courts would awkwardly ignore 
whether there was any truth to the blackmailer’s charges.354  Certainly not 
all victims of blackmail were innocent, yet courts offered protection even to 
those accused of transgressing society’s strong sexual taboos and criminal 
laws.  Why were such people protected?  If the society so vehemently con-
demned sodomy at the time, why punish the blackmailers rather than those 
who may have been guilty of sodomy? 
One nineteenth-century English judge contended that blackmail was 
“one of the worst offenses known to the law.”355  As historian Angus 
McLaren notes: 
The courts had for centuries reassured the [wealthy] that their good names 
were protected by the laws on libel and slander.  The publicity given to the 
emergence of the blackmailer raised the horrific possibility that the pillaging of 
the propertied could be carried out by those who threatened not to tell hurtful 
lies, but obscene truths.356  
Blackmail has long posed a conundrum for legal scholars.357  Blackmail 
involves coercing an individual by threatening to expose her personal se-
crets if she does not accede to the demands of the blackmailer, which often 
involve paying hush money.358  Why should society restrict contracts not to 
353 ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL 17 (2002) (noting that there were no execu-
tions for sodomy in England after 1836). 
354 See id. at 21 (explaining that “[v]ictims who appeared to have engaged in same-sex 
activities put the courts in a potentially awkward situation,” as the courts did not want to ex-
onerate those who had engaged in same-sex activities). 
355 Id. at 20 (quoting Central Criminal Court, TIMES (London), June 20, 1895, at 3). 
356 Id. at 28-29. 
357 See LEO KATZ, ILL GOTTEN GAINS 140-45 (1996) (discussing various philosophers’ 
interpretations of the connection between blackmail and coercion and the difficulties of for-
mulating a complete theory).  The term “blackmail” originated in Tudor times and referred to 
extortion in general.  MCLAREN, supra note 353, at 12.  “Modern blackmail first emerged 
when criminals in the eighteenth century recognized that the laws against sodomy provided 
them with the means by which they could extort money from those whom they could entrap.”  
Id. at 3. 
358 See 31A AM. JUR. 2D, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 20 (2002) (recognizing 
that, although statutes differ in form, the use of a threat to extract something is at the heart of 
blackmail).  For a discussion of how blackmail laws protected reputations in different periods 
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divulge secrets?  Blackmail does not seem to be about preventing disclo-
sure, for as Joseph Izenberg argues, prohibiting a blackmailer compensation 
for silence will likely make disclosure more probable.359  If this is the case, 
then what interest does the crime of blackmail protect? 
Scholars have offered a panoply of hypotheses.  Richard Posner argues 
that blackmail is illegal because it neither maximizes wealth nor provides 
any net social benefit.360  In contrast, Gary Anderson and Walter Block con-
tend that blackmail, as distinct from extortion, involves a transaction just 
like any other, in which both parties bargain for the result they desire.361  
Jennifer Brown finds that blackmail undermines the criminal justice system 
by enabling private contracts that withhold information from the justice sys-
tem.362  Richard Epstein proposes that blackmail is socially detrimental be-
cause it “breeds fraud and deceit.”363  According to Wendy Gordon, black-
mail is illegal because it involves the blackmailer treating the victim as a 
means (to earn money) rather than an end.364  Finally, Richard McAdams 
argues that blackmail inhibits the development of social norms by stifling 
public norm enforcement and the discussion and critique of norms.365 
I posit that blackmail is criminalized because of the power relationship 
it creates.  Blackmail allows a person to be dominated and controlled by an-
other.  With blackmail, the harm is not in the actual disclosure of the infor-
mation, but in the control exercised by the one who makes the threat over 
the data subject.  In some cases, blackmail can also involve information 
more akin to exposure than disclosure.  Breach of confidentiality is also re-
lated to blackmail, as a confidant can threaten to disclose a secret in return 
of American history, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers:  Privacy, Blackmail, and 
Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1112-13 (2002) (observing 
that blackmail went “against the American grain” of allowing second chances and fresh 
starts). 
359 Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail From A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1914 (1993) 
(noting that in any given case, individuals who have obtained valuable information are most 
likely to disclose it in the presence of a law forbidding bargaining for secrecy with data sub-
jects, though in the long run, such laws will deter potential blackmailers from digging for 
valuable information). 
360 Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1817, 1818-20 (1993). 
361 Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion and Exchange, 44 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 541, 544-47 (2001). 
362 Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 
1971 (1993). 
363 Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 565 (1983). 
364 Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences:  The Force of Blackmail’s Central Case, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1761 (1993). 
365 Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2237, 2243-64 (1996). 
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for money.  Blackmail differs from disclosure, exposure, and breach of con-
fidentiality in that it involves a threat of disclosure rather than an actual dis-
closure. 
A rough analogy may be made to the crimes of battery and assault.  
Battery involves actual physical harm, whereas assault is putting a person in 
fear of physical harm.366  But there are important differences between 
blackmail and assault.  Unlike assault, where the violence threatened is ille-
gal, with blackmail, the threatened disclosure can be perfectly legal.  In-
deed, the disclosure might be socially beneficial in that it might reveal that 
the blackmail victim committed a crime or heinous act.  But the threat of 
disclosure is so profoundly disempowering that society still wants to protect 
against it.  Toward the end of Henrik Ibsen’s play, Hedda Gabler, Judge 
Brack, who knows a damaging secret about Hedda Gabler, says to her, “My 
dearest Hedda, believe me I shall not abuse the position.”  Hedda replies, 
“In your power, all the same.  At the mercy of your will and demands.  And 
so a slave!  A slave!”367  The more people know about us, the more they can 
exercise control over us.  This is why telling one’s deepest secrets to another 
makes one vulnerable.  Prohibiting blackmail prevents people from taking 
advantage of us with our personal information. 
The purpose of restricting blackmail is not to limit disclosure but to 
prevent the use of the threat of disclosure as a tool for exerting power and 
dominion over others.  Our society prohibits slavery, labor below the mini-
mum wage, dangerous workplace conditions, and quid pro quo sexual har-
assment even if the victim seemingly consents.  The rationale for these pro-
hibitions stems in part from the fact that these acts are so coercive that the 
consent is not voluntary, and so place excessive power over one person in 
the hands of another.  Blackmail similarly demonstrates the profound dan-
ger of the threat of disclosure as an instrument of power over another per-
son.  Indeed, criminal codes classify blackmail as a form of extortion, which 
involves the use of fear or threats to force someone to submit to another’s 
will.368 
The crime of blackmail thus prevents the use of disclosure, exposure, or 
breach of confidentiality as a means for exercising power over another per-
son.  Dissemination of information is a powerful tool, one that can be 
366 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (defining battery); id. § 21 (de-
fining assault). 
367 HENRIK IBSEN, Hedda Gabler, in HEDDA GABLER AND OTHER PLAYS 362 (Una 
Ellis-Fermor trans., Penguin Books 1961). 
368 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 1999) (defining extortion as “the obtaining 
of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public offi-
cer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear”). 
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wielded to achieve levels of domination and control that may not be socially 
beneficial.  This is why the threats are usually treated as part of the wrong-
ful act itself. 
6.  Appropriation 
In 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., a flour company 
included a lithograph of Abigail Roberson, a minor, on 25,000 advertise-
ment flyers without her consent.369  The flyers were captioned, “Flour of the 
Family.”370  Roberson alleged that she “ha[d] been greatly humiliated by the 
scoffs and jeers of persons who ha[d] recognized her face and picture on 
this advertisement, and her good name ha[d] been attacked, causing her 
great distress and suffering, both in body and mind.”371  The portrait, how-
ever, was neither racy nor libelous.  “The likeness is said to be a very good 
one,” the court noted, and Roberson was “caused to suffer mental distress 
where others would have appreciated the compliment to their beauty im-
plied in the selection of the picture for such purposes.”372  The court refused 
to recognize a remedy based on Warren and Brandeis’s article, concluding 
that such an action was the proper domain of the legislature.373 
Roberson caused quite a stir.  An editorial in The New York Times lam-
basted the decision and noted that it “excited as much amazement among 
lawyers and jurists as among the promiscuous lay public.”374  Shortly after 
the decision, a comment in the Yale Law Journal criticized the Roberson 
decision for not recognizing a remedy for the “undoubted injury to the 
plaintiff.”375  The strong criticism of the decision even led one of the judges 
of the majority to defend the opinion in the Columbia Law Review.376  A 
year later, New York passed a law creating a cause of action to redress the 
type of injury Roberson suffered.377  The law still remains viable today.378 
369 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
370 Id. 
371 Id.  Roberson became so ill that she had to see a physician.  Id. 
372 Id. at 442-43. 
373 Id. at 447-48 (applying Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21). 
374 Editorial, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8, reprinted in Denis 
O’Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 438 (1902). 
375 Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?:  Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
Co., 12 YALE L.J. 35, 36 (1902). 
376 O’Brien, supra note 374, at 437. 
377 See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law:  A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (1990) (noting that the statutes “made it both a tort 
and a misdemeanor . . . to use another’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes 
without the subject’s consent”). 
378 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992). 
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The tort of appropriation was thus one of the first privacy torts to be 
recognized after Warren and Brandeis’s article.  The tort of appropriation 
occurs when “[o]ne . . . appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another.”379  To be liable for appropriation, “the defendant must 
have appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or 
commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name 
or likeness.”380 
Why did Roberson create such a response?  What spurred such an ex-
tensive public discussion and prompt legislative action? What is problem-
atic about using a person’s name or photograph in an advertisement?  After 
all, one’s name and image are often not secret.  The picture of Roberson was 
flattering and did not ruin her reputation.  What was the injury? 
“Appropriation” is the use of one’s identity or personality for the pur-
poses and goals of another.  Appropriation, like the privacy disruptions of 
disclosure and distortion, involves the way an individual desires to present 
herself to society. 
The tort of appropriation has currently lost its way, as courts and com-
mentators have not been able to adequately explain the injury that is re-
dressed by the tort.  Two competing accounts of the injury predominate in 
cases and commentary.381  Many commentators describe the harm caused by 
the use of one’s likeness for commercial purposes as an affront to dignity; 
Edward Bloustein argued that the harm caused to an individual by appro-
priation is the “demeaning and humiliating . . . commercialization of an as-
pect of personality.”382 
Another rationale for the tort is as a protection of property rights.  
Prosser, who was profoundly influential in the creation of the four modern 
privacy torts, viewed the interest protected by the appropriation tort as “not 
so much a mental as a proprietary one.”383  According to Jonathan Kahn, the 
“early association of appropriation claims with such intangible, non-
commensurable attributes of the self as dignity and the integrity of one’s 
persona seems to have been lost, or at least misplaced, as property-based 
conceptions of the legal status of identity have come to the fore.”384  Courts 
379 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
380 Id. § 652C cmt. c. 
381 See generally Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis:  Privacy, Property, 
and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991) (contrasting the “property” and 
“dignity” rationales for the tort of appropriation). 
382 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987 (1964). 
383 Prosser, supra note 20, at 406. 
384 Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light:  Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of 
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 223 (1999).  A new 
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have transformed a tort’s targeted harm from one of appropriation to one of 
intellectual property.  Most contemporary cases recognize that the tort of 
appropriation protects a “valuable right of property.”385  Loss of property 
seems to be more readily recognized by courts today than the more amor-
phous feelings of embarrassment or loss of dignity.386 
To the extent that the tort remains a way to protect against the loss of 
dignity, why should we inhibit social use of identities simply to prevent 
people from feeling demeaned when their identities are commercialized?  
After all, we allow people to sell their identities to endorse products.  Fur-
ther, we allow vigorous criticism and satire, which can be quite humiliating 
and injurious to people’s dignity. 
I contend that there is another important dimension of the harm of ap-
propriation—an interference with freedom and self-development.  The early 
appropriation cases allude to this aspect of the harm.  In 1905, Georgia be-
came the first state to recognize a tort based on Warren and Brandeis’s arti-
cle.  In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., a life insurance adver-
tisement used a photograph of Paolo Pavesich next to a photograph of “an 
ill-dressed and sickly looking person.”387  Under Pavesich’s picture, the ad-
vertisement stated in part:  “In my healthy and productive period of life I 
bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.”388  The ad 
seemed flattering for Pavesich, for he was the paragon of all the success and 
good fortune that would come to those who purchased insurance.389  Pave-
sich, however, was not flattered, and he sued.390  In contrast to the Roberson 
court, the Pavesich court recognized a cause of action, reasoning that “the 
body of a person cannot be put on exhibition . . . without his consent.  The 
right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper 
tort, known as the “right of publicity,” has emerged to redress violations of property rights in 
one’s name or likeness.  See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:63 (“Simplistically put, 
while the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, 
the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook.” (footnote omitted)) . 
385 DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 6:1, at 375 (1991) (quoting McQueen v. 
Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev’d on other grounds, 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. 
1968)). 
386 See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture:  A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 109, 114 (2003) (arguing that 
Prosser’s characterization of appropriation as vindicating property interests obscured the dig-
nitary interests the tort protected, and noting that “[m]odern courts are prone to subsuming the 
privacy claim under the label of publicity”). 
387 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905). 
388 Id. at 69. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. 
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places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right of personal lib-
erty.”391  The use of one’s likeness for advertising purposes can bring 
even the individual of ordinary sensibility[] to a realization that his liberty has 
been taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these 
purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the 
time being under the control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is 
in reality a slave.392 
The court speaks in terms of loss of liberty, not in terms of loss of 
monetary value.  The injury is that Pavesich has been used against his will.  
Similarly, according to Justice Gray’s dissent in Roberson, “we may not say 
that the plaintiff’s complaint is fanciful, or that her alleged injury is purely a 
sentimental one.”393  “[T]he conspicuous display of her likeness in various 
public places has . . . humiliated her by the notoriety and by the public 
comments it has provoked.”394  Justice Gray alluded to what I believe to be 
the crux of the harm:  unwanted notoriety.  The appropriation of Roberson’s 
image forced her to become a public figure.  In addition to bringing her un-
willingly into the public sphere, the appropriation defined her public role 
and public persona. 
The interest safeguarded by protections against appropriation is control 
of the way one presents oneself to society.  The products and causes people 
publicly endorse shape their public image.  When people are associated with 
products, they become known in terms of these products.  Many public fig-
ures take great care with their endorsements because these endorsements 
shape their public image.395  Thus, appropriation can be harmful even if it is 
not humiliating, degrading, or disrespectful.  Being unwillingly used to en-
dorse a product resembles, in certain respects, being compelled to speak and 
to represent certain viewpoints. 
Protection against appropriation establishes what society considers ap-
propriate for others to do in shaping a person’s identity.  The harm, then, is 
391 Id. at 70. 
392 Id. at 80. 
393 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dis-
senting). 
394 Id. 
395 For example, in 1903, Thomas Edison sought to enjoin the Edison Polyform Manu-
facturing Company from using his picture on bottles of a pain reliever that Edison himself had 
invented earlier in his career.  Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 392 (N.J. Ch. 
1907).  The court granted the injunction.  Id. at 395.  Similarly, Jacqueline Onassis sued a 
clothing company for the use of a lookalike in an advertisement because “she has never per-
mitted her name or picture to be used in connection with the promotion of commercial prod-
ucts.  Her name has been used sparingly only in connection with certain public services, civic, 
art and educational projects which she has supported.”  Onassis v. Christian Dior—New York, 
Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
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an impingement on the victim’s freedom in the authorship of her self-
narrative, not merely her loss of profits.  Prosser, however, used the term 
“appropriation,” which is a word that pertains to property.  Perhaps a better 
word to describe the harm is “exploitation.”  I continue to use the word ap-
propriation, however, because it has become so commonly known in rela-
tion to this kind of harmful activity. 
7.  Distortion 
Defamation law has existed for centuries.  Consisting of the torts of li-
bel and slander, defamation law protects against falsehoods that injure a 
person’s reputation.  In order to be liable for defamation, one must make “a 
false and defamatory statement concerning another.”396  A “defamatory” 
statement “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.”397  False light, a more recent tort inspired by the Warren 
and Brandeis article,398 protects against giving “publicity to a matter con-
cerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” that is 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”399  It safeguards “the interest of 
the individual in not being made to appear before the public in an objection-
able false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he 
is.”400  False light is categorized as one of Prosser’s four “privacy” torts.401 
In addition to false light and defamation, a number of privacy statutes 
ensure accuracy in record systems.  The Privacy Act, for example, enables a 
person to access and correct her records maintained by government agen-
cies.402  Likewise, the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides recourse for a per-
son who wants to correct her credit records,403 and the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act enables students to review and ensure the accuracy 
of their school records.404  Additionally, longstanding privacy principles, 
396 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (1977). 
397 Id. § 559. 
398 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light 
Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 885 (1991) (noting that the Warren and 
Brandeis article led to decisions which Prosser later labeled as the false light tort). 
399 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.  Although there is a significant amount 
of overlap between the two torts, false light has a more expansive view of the harm caused by 
distortion.  While defamation requires the proof of reputational harm, false light does not, and 
plaintiffs can be compensated solely for emotional distress.  Schwartz, supra note 398, at 887. 
400 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b. 
401 Prosser, supra note 20, at 389. 
402 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000). 
403 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2000). 
404 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (2000). 
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such as the Code of Fair Information Practice405 and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Privacy Guidelines, con-
tain provisions for ensuring the accuracy of records.406  The European Un-
ion Data Protection Directive contains a similar provision.407 
Why are these harms of inaccuracy understood as privacy injuries?  
Why does the law protect against these harms?  Why should people have a 
right to be judged accurately? 
I refer to these harms as “distortion.”  Distortion is the manipulation of 
the way a person is perceived and judged by others, and involves the victim 
being inaccurately exposed to the public.  I include distortion in the taxon-
omy of privacy because of its significant similarity to other privacy disrup-
tions.  Distortion, like disclosure, involves the spreading of information that 
affects the way society views a person.  Both distortion and disclosure can 
result in embarrassment, humiliation, stigma, and reputational harm.  They 
both involve the ability to control information about oneself and to have 
some limited dominion over the way one is viewed by society.  Distortion 
differs from disclosure, however, because with distortion, the information 
revealed is false and misleading. 
Throughout most of western history, one’s reputation and character 
have been viewed as indispensable to self-identity and the ability to engage 
in public life.  For centuries, the loss of social regard has had deleterious ef-
fects on one’s wealth, prosperity, and employment.408  Social regard, accep-
tance, and honor are extremely valuable, and they have power over us be-
cause they are integral to how we relate to others.  Robert Post observes that 
defamation law also exists for 
the protection of an individual’s interest in dignity, which is to say his interest 
in being included within the forms of social respect; and the enforcement of 
405 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at xx-xxiii (listing 
and discussing “safeguard requirements” and recommendations for automated personal data 
systems). 
406 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION 
OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980).  For more background 
on the OECD Guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic 
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 773-81 (1999). 
407 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 46, art. 6.   
408 Arlette Farge, The Honor and Secrecy of Families, in 3 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 
571, 585 (Roger Chartier ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989).  Heinrich Böll’s novella, The 
Lost Honor of Katharina Blum, is a remarkable account of the harm of distortion.  See 
HEINRICH BÖLL, THE LOST HONOR OF KATHARINA BLUM (Leila Vennewitz trans., 1975) 
(featuring a character whose life is ruined due to the publication of misleading information). 
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society’s interest in its rules of civility, which is to say its interest in defining 
and maintaining the contours of its own social constitution.409 
Reputation is not merely an individual creation. Although it is true that 
people work very hard to build their reputations, one’s reputation is the 
product of the judgment of other people in society.  Reputation is a currency 
through which we interact with each other.  Protection against distortion 
structures our interactions because it protects this currency.  Distortion not 
only affects the aggrieved individual; it also affects the society that judges 
that individual:  it interferes with our relationships to that individual, and it 
inhibits our ability to assess the character of those that we deal with.  We are 
thus deceived in our relationships with others; these relationships are tainted 
by false information that prevents us from making sound and fair judg-
ments.  Distortion’s direct impact is felt by the aggrieved individual, but it 
has effects for all of society.  We want to avoid arbitrary and undeserved 
disruption of social relations.   
The enigmatic and devious Iago’s comments in William Shakespeare’s 
Othello capture the importance of reputation: 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls; 
Who steals my purse steals trash:  ’tis something, nothing;  
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands. 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.410 
Using the power of reputation, Iago orchestrates a series of distortions to 
make Othello believe that his wife, Desdemona, is having an affair with his 
lieutenant, Cassio.  These distortions induce Othello into a murderous rage, 
during which he suffocates his wife.  Othello illustrates the profound de-
structiveness of distortion, which tears apart relationships, dissolves trust, 
and instigates violence. 
D.  Invasion 
The final grouping of privacy harms I label as “invasion.”  Invasion 
harms differ from the harms of information collection, networking, and dis-
semination because they do not always involve information.  I discuss two 
types of invasion:  (1) intrusion, and (2) decisional interference. 
409 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law:  Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 711 (1986). 
410 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3, 
sc. 3, ll. 158-64 (Edward Pechter ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) (1623). 
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1.  Intrusion 
For hundreds of years, the law has strongly guarded the privacy of the 
home.411  According to William Blackstone, “the law . . . has so particular 
and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his cas-
tle.”412  The law protects the home from trespass by others as well as from 
nuisances.413  As Thomas Cooley observed in his famous treatise on consti-
tutional law in 1868, “it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpun-
ished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his 
trunks broken open, his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying 
curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious per-
sons.”414  The Fourth Amendment protects the home, as well as one’s body 
and baggage, from searches by government officials.415  One of the torts in-
spired by Warren and Brandeis’s article is intrusion upon seclusion, which 
creates a cause of action when one intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another or his private affairs or concerns” if the intrusion is “highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person.”416  Why is it important to protect a safe 
zone, a private realm free from intrusions? 
Understood broadly, these actions are all forms of “intrusion.”  Intru-
sion involves invasions or incursions into one’s life.  It disturbs the victim’s 
daily activities, alters her routines, destroys her solitude, and often makes 
her feel uncomfortable and uneasy.  Protection against intrusion involves 
protecting the individual from unwanted social invasions, affording people 
what Warren and Brandeis called “the right to be let alone.”417 
Intrusion is related to disclosure, as disclosure is often made possible by 
intrusive information gathering activities.  Intrusion into one’s private 
sphere can be caused not only by physical incursion and proximity but also 
411 The notion that the home was one’s “castle” was articulated as early as 1499.  See 
Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 
(1981) (dating the first mention to a report written in 1499); see also Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. 
Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and for-
tress.”). 
412 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223. 
413 Nuisance involves “an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment 
of land.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).  William Blackstone defined pri-
vate nuisance as “any thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or heredi-
taments of another.”  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216. 
414 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306 (1868). 
415 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated . . . .”). 
416 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
417 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 193. 
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by gazes (surveillance) or questioning (interrogation).  Intrusion has a cer-
tain resemblance to surveillance, in that being stared at for extended periods 
of time can be quite invasive and penetrating and also disturbing, frighten-
ing, and disruptive.  Intrusion is also related to interrogation, as people can 
experience interrogation as a kind of intrusion into their affairs. 
The harm caused by intrusion, however, differs from that caused by 
other types of disruption because intrusion interrupts one’s activities 
through the unwanted presence or activities of another person.  The case of 
Galella v. Onassis provides a good illustration of how intrusion is related 
yet distinct from forms of information gathering.418  Galella, a paparazzo, 
routinely harassed Jacqueline Onassis and her children with the late Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, John and Caroline.  To capture pictures, Galella 
jumped into John’s path as he was riding his bike, interrupted Caroline’s 
tennis, and, in the words of the trial judge, “insinuated himself into the very 
fabric of Mrs. Onassis’ life.”419  Galella’s activities involved monitoring, 
akin to surveillance, yet they were also physically intrusive. 
Intrusion need not involve spatial incursions:  spam, junk mail, junk 
faxes, and telemarketing are disruptive in a similar way, as they sap peo-
ple’s time and attention and interrupt their activities.  While many forms of 
intrusion are motivated by a desire to gather information or result in the 
revelation of information, intrusion can cause harm even if no information is 
involved.  In particular, intrusion often interferes with solitude, the state of 
being alone or able to retreat from the presence of others.  Indeed, Warren 
and Brandeis wrote from a tradition of solitude inspired by Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Emily Dickinson.420 
For centuries, however, solitude has been criticized as self-indulgent.421  
As Aristotle observed:  “Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely 
happy man a solitary; for no one would choose the whole world on condi-
tion of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is 
418 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
419 Id. at 994 (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
420 Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25 
(1979). 
421 See, e.g., JANETTE DILLON, SHAKESPEARE AND THE SOLITARY MAN 3-13 (1981) 
(discussing approaches to solitude before Shakespeare’s time, which viewed a solitary life as 
running counter to the good of the community).  Solitude, which became a coveted aspect of 
existence by the end of the seventeenth century, was viewed by many as dangerous and unde-
sireable during the Middle Ages.  See Michel Rouche, Private Life Conquers State and Soci-
ety, in 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 408, at 419, 434-35 (describing the concern 
a ninth-century abbot had for the hermit’s solitary life). 
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to live with others.”422  Under this view, solitude is a form of retreat from 
solidarity, a condition of being isolated and self-interested in which a person 
can escape her social responsibilities.423  Too much of such freedom from 
intrusion can lead to a scattered community, where people distance them-
selves into isolated enclaves.424  Why do we want to allow people to have a 
realm in which they can avoid the presence of others in society? 
The protection of a realm of solitude does not merely benefit the indi-
vidual; it is built into society’s structure for a social purpose.  Hannah Ar-
endt notes that while the Greeks viewed the public sphere as having para-
mount importance, the private sphere was essential to shaping the 
dimensions and quality of life in the public sphere: 
A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would 
say, shallow.  While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into 
sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its 
depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.425 
In other words, solitude does not detract from a rich public life, but in fact 
enhances it.  Solitude enables people to rest from the pressures of living in 
public and performing public roles.426  Too much envelopment in society 
can be destructive to social relationships.  For Thoreau, solitude fosters bet-
ter social relationships because “we live thick and are in each other’s way, 
and stumble over one another, and I think that we thus lose some respect for 
one another.”427  Without refuge from others, relationships can become 
more bitter and tense.  Moreover, a space apart from others has enabled 
people to develop artistic, political, and religious ideas that have had lasting 
influence and value when later introduced into the public sphere.428 
422 ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA § 1169b, ll. 18-19 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon 
Press 1925) (n.d.). 
423 See Michael A. Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, in NOMOS, supra 
note 71, at 88, 91-93 (discussing critiques of solitude). 
424 See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 512-13 (1961) (demonstrating how 
technological improvements have led to increased isolation). 
425 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958). 
426 According to philosopher Philip Koch, solitude “gives respite and restoration, a time 
and a place to lick the wounds of social strife.”  PHILIP KOCH, SOLITUDE 5 (1994); see also 
WESTIN, supra note 19, at 35 (“[N]o individual can play indefinitely, without relief, the vari-
ety of roles that life demands. . . . Privacy in this aspect gives individuals, from factory work-
ers to Presidents, a chance to lay their masks aside for rest.  To be always ‘on’ would destroy 
the human organism.”). 
427 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 113 (Barnes 
& Noble Books 1993) (1854). 
428 Many social, political, and religious leaders began their influential public work with 
preparations performed in private.  See, e.g., JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BE-
TWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE:  THE LOST BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 37 (1979) (describing 
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Generally, courts recognize intrusion upon seclusion tort actions only 
when a person is at home or in a secluded place.429  This approach is akin to 
courts recognizing a harm in surveillance only when conducted in private, 
not in public.430  However, beyond solitude, people often expect space from 
others—even when they are with other people.  According to sociologist Ir-
win Altman, we need “personal space,” a kind of zone or aura around us to 
separate ourselves from others.431  Spatial distance provides for “comfort, 
ease, and relaxation.”432  Animals maintain “remarkably constant” distances 
from other animals of the same species.433  In one series of studies, people 
placed themselves very close to others, sparking strong reactions of hostility 
and unease; the intruded-upon subjects quickly reestablished appropriate 
spatial boundaries.434  As Robert Post observes, the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion upholds rules of civility and social respect.435  We each have cer-
tain “territories of the self,” and norms of civility require that we respect 
others’ territories.436  We can, however, “invite intimacy by waiving our 
claims to a territory and allowing others to draw close.”437 
Some courts are beginning to recognize realms of exclusion where peo-
ple can shut others out, even in public.438  Realms of exclusion are not 
how a “religious hero[’s]” retreat to privacy would inspire followers on his return to the public 
life); Richard H. Weisberg, It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist, It’s a Codifier!  Reflections on 
Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 92 (1996) (noting that, for Nietzsche, “[t]he 
great legislator is himself (or herself) conceived of as one whose act of social codification be-
gins with a private program of creative self-fulfillment”).  As sixteenth-century French essay-
ist Michel de Montaigne contended, solitude—even for public figures—is not self-indulgent, 
for “[t]hey have only stepped back to make a better jump, to get a stronger impetus wherewith 
to plunge deeper into the crowd.”  MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Solitude, in THE COMPLETE 
ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 174, 182 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958). 
429 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“The defendant 
is subject to liability . . . only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise in-
vaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”). 
430 See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text. 
431 IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:  PRIVACY, PERSONAL 
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 52-54 (Irvington 1981) (1975). 
432 Id. at 96. 
433 Id. at 52. 
434 Id. at 87-89. 
435 Post, supra note 44, at 966-68. 
436 Id. at 971-73 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN 
PUBLIC 28 (1971)). 
437 Id. at 973. 
438 See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998) (holding 
that a car accident victim had a privacy interest in her conversation with medical rescuers at 
the accident scene); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 
(Iowa 1987) (holding that broadcasting video of the plaintiff eating at a restaurant might have 
violated her privacy interest and noting that “the mere fact a person can be seen by others does 
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realms of seclusion; they are structures for personal space that allow us to 
interact with others without the interference of the rest of society.  Commu-
nication and association with others often require freedom from intrusion.  
For example, when we talk to a friend in a restaurant or another public 
place, we still need space from other people in order to converse freely.  In 
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, an undercover reporter ac-
cepted work as a “telepsychic” and surreptitiously videotaped conversations 
she had at work with her coworkers, including Sanders.439  Even though 
Sanders worked in a cubicle where he could readily be seen and overheard 
by other employees, the court concluded that he had a viable privacy inter-
est: “[T]he concept of ‘seclusion’ is relative.  The mere fact that a person 
can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can le-
gally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.”440 
2.  Decisional Interference 
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution prohibited the government from banning the use of contracep-
tives by married couples.441  Although the word “privacy” is not explicitly 
mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, the Court reasoned that the Consti-
tution provides for a “right to privacy” in the “penumbras” of many of the 
amendments in the Bill of Rights.442  The Court noted that “[v]arious guar-
antees [by the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”443 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the reasoning in Griswold to 
the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons as well.444  The Court ex-
plained that privacy “is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”445 
Subsequently, the Court held in Roe v. Wade that the right to privacy “en-
compass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.”446 
not mean that person cannot legally be ‘secluded’”(quoting Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 
F. Supp. 1282, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1986))). 
439 978 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Cal. 1999). 
440 Id. at 72 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5.10[A][2]). 
441 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
442 Id. at 484. 
443 Id. 
444 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
445 Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted). 
446 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Baird all protect against what I call “deci-
sional interference”—that is, governmental interference with people’s deci-
sions regarding certain matters of their lives.  These cases extend to deci-
sions relating to sex and sexuality, while others extend to decisions 
concerning the upbringing of one’s children.447  Many commentators have 
argued that the language of privacy is inappropriate for decisional interfer-
ence cases, since they primarily concern a harm to autonomy and liberty, 
not to privacy.  Thus, Laurence Tribe argues that the central issue in Roe v. 
Wade is “not privacy, but autonomy.”448  Similarly, Louis Henkin contends 
that the Supreme Court’s substantive due process right-to-privacy cases are 
about protecting a “zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to govern-
mental regulation,” not about protecting privacy.449  What relationship does 
decisional interference have with the other forms of privacy in the taxon-
omy? 
The decisional interference cases are deeply connected to information 
privacy.450  In particular, just a few years after Roe v. Wade, the Court ex-
plained in Whalen v. Roe that the constitutionally protected “zone of pri-
vacy” extends not only to the “interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions” but also to the “individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”451  This gave rise to the constitutional right 
to information privacy, which, although not developed further by the Su-
preme Court, has been recognized by most federal circuit courts.452  Whalen 
447 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating an 
Oregon law requiring parents to send their children to public school, because it “unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control”). 
448 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352 (2d ed. 1988). 
449 Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410-11 (1974). 
450 Thanks to Neil Richards for pointing this out. 
451 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
452 See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We agree . . . that the 
indiscriminate public disclosure of [certain personal information] may implicate the constitu-
tional right to informational privacy.”); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (“Personal, private information in which an individual has a reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality is protected by one’s constitutional right to privacy.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Whether or not Kimberlin has a privacy 
interest in the information . . . depends upon whether he has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the information.”); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“Most courts considering the question . . .appear to agree that privacy of personal matters is a 
[constitutionally] protected interest . . . .”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 
1981) (“Our opinion does not mean . . . there is no constitutional right to non-disclosure of 
private information.”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 
1980) (recognizing that Whalen protects “the right not to have an individual’s private affairs 
made public by the government”); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(“There is another strand to the right to privacy properly called the right to confidentiality.”). 
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involved a challenge to a requirement that physicians report to the state the 
names and addresses of patients who received prescriptions for certain 
classes of drugs.  The Whalen Court linked decisional interference with dis-
closure by suggesting that “[t]he mere existence in readily available form of 
the information about patients’ use of [the] drugs creates a genuine concern 
that the information will become publicly known and that it will adversely 
affect their reputations.  This concern makes some patients reluctant to use 
[the drugs] . . . .”453  By creating a risk of disclosure, the statute inhibited 
patients’ decisions regarding their healthcare.454  The Court ultimately re-
jected the plaintiff’s challenge because the state provided adequate protec-
tion against the “unwarranted disclosure” of the patient information.455  
Thus, Whalen illustrates how decisional interference relates to disclosure.  
Whalen also shows how decisional interference bears similarities to in-
creased accessibility, since the existence of information in a government da-
tabase can increase the potential accessibility of that information. 
Decisional interference also resembles insecurity, secondary use, and 
exclusion, in that all three of these information-processing harms can have a 
chilling effect on a person’s decisions regarding her health and body. 
Decisional interference and exposure have been judicially recognized to 
affect the same aspects of the self—health, the body, sex, and so on.  The 
decisional interference cases track traditional areas that are widely consid-
ered to be private, such as the home, family, and body.  Decisional interfer-
ence, therefore, does not apply to all decisions, but only to a subset of deci-
sions; this aspect of decisional interference resembles exposure in its focus 
on those aspects of life which are socially considered to be the most private. 
Decisional interference bears a similarity to the harm of intrusion as 
both involve invasions into realms where we believe people should be free 
from the incursions of others.  Whereas intrusion involves the unwanted 
general incursion of another’s presence or activities, decisional interference 
involves unwanted incursion by the government into an individual’s deci-
sions about her personal life.  The resemblance is demonstrated by examin-
ing the first in the Court’s line of right-to-privacy cases, its 1891 decision in 
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.456  There, the Court held that a fe-
male plaintiff in a civil action could not be forced to submit to a surgical ex-
amination:  “To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the 
body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is 
453 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. at 600-02. 
456 141 U.S. 250 (1891). 
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an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. . . .”457  The Court emphasized the 
importance of what Judge Cooley had termed the right “to be let alone” 
which Warren and Brandeis used in their article one year earlier.458  While 
the intrusion at issue in Botsford clearly implicated the harms of intrusion 
and exposure, it also resembled decisional interference.  The Court captured 
this parallel in stating that the right “to be let alone” was “carefully guarded 
by the common law” and consisted of “the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”459 
Another case illustrating the connection between decisional interference 
and intrusion is Stanley v. Georgia, which involved a challenge to an ob-
scenity statute that punished the private possession of obscene material.460  
Stanley was cited as support for the constitutional right to privacy in Roe v. 
Wade461 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.462  Although the material in Stanley was 
obscene and could properly be banned under the First Amendment, the 
Court concluded that “the Constitution protects the right to receive informa-
tion and ideas . . . regardless of their social worth.”463  The Court noted that 
this “right takes on an added dimension” in a “prosecution for mere posses-
sion of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home.”464  
It is a fundamental right “to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”465  The Court 
quoted Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States,466 a Fourth 
Amendment wiretapping case, in which Brandeis argued that the “makers of 
our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized man.”467 
It is particularly interesting that the Court invoked “the right to be let 
alone,” which was Warren and Brandeis’s principle justifying the privacy 
torts.468  The criminalization of the private possession of obscene material, 
457 Id. at 252. 
458 Id. at 251; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195. 
459 Union Pacific, 141 U.S. at 251. 
460 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
461 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
462 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
463 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. 
464 Id. 
465 Id. 
466 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
467 Stanley, 395 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
468 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195. 
  
2006] A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY 557 
 
the Court’s reasoning suggests, necessitates governmental intrusion into 
one’s home.  The Court noted that people have “the right to be free from 
state inquiry into the contents of [their] library.”469  Linking decisional inter-
ference with intrusion, it stressed that “a State has no business telling a man, 
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he 
may watch.”470  Further capturing the relationship between the two catego-
ries, Robert Post contends that the intrusion tort protects “territories of the 
self,” which are critical to remaining “an independent and autonomous per-
son.”471 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court further demonstrated the frequent over-
lap between decisional interference and intrusion in striking down a law that 
prohibited consensual homosexual sodomy.472  The Court reasoned that 
“adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free per-
sons.”473  The statute was unconstitutional because of “its [unjustified] in-
trusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”474  Moreover, 
the Court stated: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a 
dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is not omnipresent 
in the home.  And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside 
the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.  Freedom ex-
tends beyond spatial bounds.475 
The Court thus linked decisional interference to intrusion. 
Decisional interference also bears an indirect resemblance to blackmail, 
in that laws restricting consensual private sexual behavior often give rise to 
blackmail.  The Lawrence Court noted that in 1955, when crafting the 
Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute recommended against 
criminalizing “consensual sexual relations conducted in private”476 in part 
because “the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others,” and 
because “the laws were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of 
blackmail.”477  Indeed, as Angus McLaren recounts, blackmail historically 
469 Stanley, 395 U.S. at 565. 
470 Id. 
471 Post, supra note 44, at 973. 
472 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
473 Id. at 567. 
474 Id. at 578. 
475 Id. at 562. 
476 Id. at 572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)) 
477 Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmt. at 277-78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
1955)).  For an interesting discussion of Lawrence and public versus private places, see Lior 
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occurred in the shadow of laws that punished consensual sexual activities in 
private.478  McLaren writes:  “Society preferred to blame the eruption of 
blackmail on certain ‘dangerous’ women and men rather than come to terms 
with the tension between the laws and the sexual practices that often pro-
vided temptation to unscrupulous individuals.”479 
CONCLUSION 
In 1960, William Prosser identified just four interests under the rubric 
of privacy, and focused exclusively on tort law.  His effort is far too narrow 
and far too out-of-date to serve as an effective guide to the privacy problems 
we face today.  In this Article, I have attempted to provide a clearer and 
more robust account of privacy—one that provides us with a framework for 
understanding privacy problems.  The taxonomy demonstrates that privacy 
disruptions are different from one another and yet share important similari-
ties.  The taxonomy enables us to see privacy in a more multidimensional 
way.480 
Although all of the privacy harms I identify in the taxonomy are related 
in some way, they are not all related in the same way—there is no common 
denominator that links them all.  Privacy violations are a group of related 
harms, each of which has received at least some recognition in the law.  But 
our understanding of privacy remains in a fog, and the law remains frag-
mented and inconsistent. 
Too many courts and policymakers struggle with even identifying the 
presence of a privacy problem.  Protecting privacy requires careful balanc-
ing, as neither privacy nor its countervailing interests are absolute values.  
Unfortunately, due to conceptual confusion, courts and legislatures often 
fail to recognize privacy problems, and thus no balancing ever takes place.  
This does not mean that privacy should always win in the balance, but it 
should not be dismissed just because it is ignored or misconstrued. 
Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After Lawrence 
v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005). 
478 MCLAREN, supra note 353, at 6. 
479 Id. at 8. 
480 One might ask why we should even retain the term “privacy” if it is simply a broader 
way to describe a group of different types of harms.  Why not simply refer to the particular 
harms themselves and jettison the term “privacy” altogether?  But this view overlooks a key 
aspect of the way we refer to things and think about them.  Although the various harms I iden-
tify in the taxonomy are different from one another, and although they do not have a core 
characteristic in common, they do, as I have shown in this Article, share many important simi-
larities. 
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When translated into the legal system, privacy is a form of protection 
against certain harmful or problematic activities.  The activities that affect 
privacy are not necessarily socially undesirable or worthy of sanction or 
prohibition.  This fact is what makes addressing privacy issues so complex.  
In many instances, there is no clear-cut wrongdoer, no indisputable villain 
whose activities lack social value.  Instead, many privacy problems emerge 
as a result of efficacious activities, much like pollution is an outgrowth of 
industrial production.  With the taxonomy, I have attempted to demonstrate 
that these activities are not without cost, that they have certain nontrivial ef-
fects on people’s lives and well-being. 
Courts and policymakers often have great difficulty in arriving at a co-
herent assessment of the various privacy problems and harms that they must 
address.  One common pitfall is viewing “privacy” as a particular kind of 
harm to the exclusion of all others.  As illustrated throughout this Article, 
courts generally find no privacy interest if information is in the public do-
main, if people are monitored in public, if information is gathered in a pub-
lic place, if no intimate or embarrassing details are revealed, or if no new 
data is collected about a person.  If courts and legislatures focused instead 
on the privacy problems, many of these distinctions and determinative fac-
tors would matter much less in the analysis.  Thus, when analyzing surveil-
lance issues, courts focus on whether the surveillance occurs in public or in 
private, even though problems and harms can emerge in all settings.  Ag-
gregation creates problems even when all of the data is already available in 
the public domain.  The same is true of increased accessibility.  For disclo-
sure, the secrecy of the information becomes a central dispositive factor; 
this approach often misses the crux of the disclosure harm, which is not the 
revelation of total secrets, but the spreading of information beyond expected 
boundaries.  In intrusion analyses, courts often fail to recognize harm when 
people are intruded upon in public places, yet the nature of the harm is not 
limited solely to private places. 
At other times, the privacy problem at issue is misconstrued.  For ex-
ample, identification is often understood as a harm created by revealing 
one’s name, but the essence of the problem is being linked to a stream of 
data, not only a name.  Insecurity is often not adequately addressed by the 
law because a materialized harm has not yet occurred.  But insecurity re-
mains a problem, even where there has been no actual disclosure or leakage 
of embarrassing details.  Appropriation is understood primarily as a harm to 
property interests, and its dignitary dimensions are thus frequently ignored 
by courts.  Further complicating matters is the fact that privacy problems are 
inconsistently recognized across different areas of the law.  For example, 
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tort law readily recognizes and redresses breach of confidentiality, yet 
Fourth Amendment law ignores it as a harm. 
Courts and legislatures respond well to more traditional privacy prob-
lems, such as intrusions that are physical in nature, disclosures of deep se-
crets, or distortion.  This is due, in part, to the fact that these problems track 
traditional conceptions of privacy.  In the secrecy paradigm, a privacy viola-
tion is understood as the uncovering of a person’s hidden world.  Physical 
intrusions are problems that even people in ancient times could experience 
and understand.  But some of the privacy problems we face today are differ-
ent in nature, and do not track traditional conceptions of privacy.  They in-
volve efforts to gain knowledge about an individual without physically in-
truding or even gathering data directly from them (aggregation), or 
problems that emerge from the way that the data is handled and maintained 
(insecurity), the way it is used (secondary use), and the inability of people to 
participate in its processing (exclusion).  Modern privacy problems emerge 
not just from disclosing deep secrets, but from making obscure information 
more accessible (increased accessibility) or from consistent observation or 
eavesdropping (surveillance). 
The taxonomy lays down a framework to understand the range of pri-
vacy problems, the similarities and differences among them, the relation-
ships among them, and what it is that makes them problematic.  By focusing 
on activities, the taxonomy also seeks to emphasize how privacy problems 
arise.  Often, technology is involved in various privacy problems, as it fa-
cilitates the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information.  Pri-
vacy problems, however, are caused not by technology alone, but primarily 
through activities of people, businesses, and the government.  The way to 
address privacy problems is to regulate these activities. 
With a framework for identifying and understanding privacy problems, 
courts and policymakers can better balance privacy considerations against 
countervailing interests.  This Article is thus the beginning of what will 
hopefully be a more comprehensive and coherent understanding of privacy. 
 
